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Conditions laid down for axing Bonn's Pershings

DER TAGESSPIEGEL

Chancellor Kohl has decided that the German Pershing I missiles will be scrapped if the Americans and Russians phase out their medium-range missiles world-wide.

His decision, taken without discussing it with the Cabinet, is supported by some members of his own CDU party, by the Free Democrats and Social Democrats and, perhaps also by the Greens.

It is a decision that should eliminate a disarmament talks handicap which neither the Russians nor the Americans are directly responsible for. It will also strengthen Chancellor Kohl's external position but not relations with the Bavarian CSU wing of his party.

Chancellor Kohl's statement was to the point. The offer depends on the superpowers reaching agreement; on a treaty ratification; and on observance of deadlines.

The conditions are appropriate because the original superpower talks terms covered American and Soviet weapons, not those of third states.

The 72 Pershing IAs and the right to modernise them are not to be relinquished without the certainty that the two superpowers will physically scrap the weapons once they agree on it.

Herr Kohl has brushed aside the idea, originally devised in the Chancellor's Office, that the Bundeswehr's Pershings might be scrapped in return for the Soviet Union scrapping Scud missiles stationed in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Instead, the Chancellor merely called on the Soviet Union and its partners to take Bonn's worries seriously and eliminate this threat.

That was appropriate. No-one with any experience or knowledge of the facts could possibly expect to swap 72 Pershings for several hundred Scuds, especially as they differ as weapon systems.

The Chancellor has put himself in the position of at least being able to call, with a high public profile, on the East to show some goodwill. His decision also comes as a blow for freedom.

It seemed that the Pershing issue kept on coming back into the German court, lobbed by the Russians, allowed by the Americans to cross the net, caught a glancing blow by Christian Democrats, who ineptly failed to do more than speed it on its way, while the Free Democrats skipped round it, lamenting the points it seemed likely to score.

Foreign Minister Genscher ran alongside it, looking around with growing impatience for the team captain, but he — the Chancellor — was on holiday.

An irritated public followed the strange proceedings from the grandstand. Few spectators were jubilant at Germany's discomfiture; many were alarmed. And when the captain finally arrived on the scene he took his time as though there was no risk whatever.

On his first working day after returning from his summer holiday the Chancellor quietly heard out Foreign Minister Genscher's advice to dispense in some way with Pershing modernisation.

He also had nothing to say on learning that the Opposition SPD had insisted on holding a special session of the Bundestag at which he was to be asked what he had to say for himself.

Assuming he might not have arrived at a decision during his summer holiday, he then knew he had to do something.

"Just another Bavarian sit in!" (Cartoon: Walter Hanel/Hannoversche Allgemeine)

On the Tuesday night he told the White House what he had decided, and hours later he made a public statement.

In the Bundestag debate he will still stand accused of hesitating for too long and to the Federal Republic's disadvantage.

The Opposition is unlikely to spare him this accusation, much though Social Democrats might welcome the decision he finally reached.

The Chancellor will be applauded by Foreign Minister Genscher's party, his coalition partners, the Free Democrats. But what about his own party, the Christian Democrats?

Alfred Dregger, CDU leader in the Bonn Bundestag, had just suggested the Pershings might be traded in for a ticket to take part in the next round of double zero negotiations.

Other Christian Democrats endorsed what they presumed to be the US viewpoint: that the Bundeswehr's Pershings were not subject to negotiation in Geneva.

At the same time as Chancellor Kohl held his press conference, CSU general secretary Gerold Tandler said the missiles must not be "sacrificed on the altar of Soviet goodwill" even if the SPD and the FDP might urge the government to do so.

The Chancellor's lone but clearly correct decision is backed by a strange coalition of some Christian Democrats plus the Free Democrats and Social Democrats and, possibly, the Greens.

This majority is bound to strengthen the Chancellor's external position. It will also be to his benefit toward Germans East and West (including East Germany's Erich Honecker).

But how it will affect his relations with his own party, let alone with the Bavarian CSU, is another matter entirely.

(Der Tagesspiegel, Berlin, 27 August 1987)

IN THIS ISSUE

No clear signals for Lebanon hostages

There are signs that Alfred Schmidt, a German hostage in Lebanon for seven months, is alive. But nothing has been heard of his fellow-hostage, Rudolf Cordes.

The publication of a video tape on which Herr Schmidt, a Siemens engineer, is seen reading out a text evidently dictated by his Lebanese kidnappers may well be the "positive signal" it is being interpreted as by the Bonn crisis staff.

Yet reference to the Beirut news magazine *As Shiraa*, which had speculated that the two Germans' release was imminent, could be taken to mean the exact opposite.

The magazine had suggested that a swap for the Lebanese terrorist Hamadei, who is in investigative custody in Frankfurt, might no longer be necessary.

But the kidnappers made it clear in their response that a ransom payment is not all they want. They insist on fulfilment of their original demand.

But Bonn can hardly afford to deport Hamadei, especially with the United States in mind. A trade-in would do Bonn immense damage in Washington.

The US government made more than one final demand for Hamadei to be handed over to the American authorities. Bonn refused, saying the likely hijacker would not be exchanged in an underhand deal with Shi'ite fanatics but tried and sentenced in Germany in accordance with the full rigour of the law.

So the Hamadei case remains the bone of contention, and the kidnappers' tape may well only just have come to light but could easily have been made in July, shortly after the Kohl Cabinet decided not to extradite Hamadei to the United States.

So it is hard to see what grounds Bonn officials can have for their guarded optimism.

Hopes of Iran or Syria stepping up their efforts to influence the fundamentalist kidnappers are somewhat vague. US journalist Charles Glass may surprisingly have been freed, but prompt rumours of greater flexibility in Teheran and Damascus cannot be verified.

Besides, it is hard to say how far their writ runs in the involved undergrowth of the Lebanese guerrilla scene. Bonn would definitely do well to retain a clear and sober sense of reality.

(Nürnberger Nachrichten, 26 August 1987)

■ WORLD AFFAIRS

Defence Minister Wörner nominated as Nato's next secretary-general

Bonn Defence Minister Manfred Wörner has been nominated to be the next secretary-general of Nato in succession to Lord Carrington, who is not seeking an extended term. A former Norwegian Prime Minister, Kaare Willoch, has also been nominated. Other names being mentioned are Belgian Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans and Italy's Foreign Minister, Giulio Andreotti.

Lord Carrington, whose term as Nato secretary-general expires next year, has indicated that he will not stand again and the German Defence Minister, Manfred Wörner, CDU, has been nominated.

But Norway's Social Democratic Prime Minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland, was first to nominate a candidate. Last month, she nominated her Conservative predecessor, Kaare Willoch, a pre-emptive move that put Herr Wörner onto the defensive.

Norway, a smaller Nato country, feels relegated to a back-seat role by the withdrawal of a Canadian brigade and the possible transfer of German naval units to the Mediterranean.

In nominating Willoch, the Norwegian government has skilfully upstaged Bonn, where Herr Wörner and Chancellor Kohl preferred, in noble self-restraint, not to outline the German position in detail until this autumn.

Bonn is not giving up. Government spokesman Norbert Schäfer said that the Federal government would be discussing the Nato appointment after the summer recess in the usual confidential manner with its allies.

Mr Willoch is a staunch Nato supporter and advocate of missile modernisation and is held in high esteem by the military.

At Nato headquarters in Brussels there are no straight fights between candidates. Views are sounded and contacts made behind closed doors to reach agreement on a candidate whose name is then referred to the defence planning committee for approval.

Herr Wörner does not just have a personal interest in taking over from Lord Carrington as secretary-general. Germany can argue that a German has yet to head Nato and that it is now its turn. Bonn wants to gain special influence in the North Atlantic pact.

In view of the double zero solution, the Germans feel out on a limb on nuclear strategy and see a need to devise a new European strategy paying greater heed to German interests than has been apparent in the superpowers' missile talks.

The Nato secretary-general may wield no administrative power, but the political role he plays has a certain significance in the situation.

Herr Wörner also feels he is preferred in the United States, which is clearly important, as America is the leading Nato power. A point that tells against him is that a fellow-German, General Wolfgang Altenburg, currently heads Nato's military committee.

That has only occurred on one previous occasion when, during the long incumbency of Joseph Luns, 1971-84, fellow-Dutchman General Cornelis de Jager headed the military committee.

And that, arguably, is an inappropriate comparison because Holland is a smaller Nato country.

Now Norway has staked its claim, the outlook for Herr Wörner is no longer felt to be as good as it was. Bonn feels one



possibility is that neither he nor Mr Willoch will make the running and that agreement may be reached on a "third party."

Belgian Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans is one man whose name is mentioned in this context. Another, if only as a marginal possibility, is Italy's Foreign Minister, Giulio Andreotti.

While the Wörner issue only concerns the CDU, nominating a successor to the late Alois Pfeiffer, who was European Commissioner responsible for economics and employment, is a trump in the game of coalition poker.

Even before Herr Pfeiffer, a former general secretary of the horticultural, farming and forestry workers' union, was buried, the CSU reminded Chancellor Kohl of an undertaking he was said to have given in 1984 to give the next available European Community appointment to a CSU nominee.

The Christian Democrats' Bavarian sister-party has yet to be represented by a commissioner in Brussels and misses no opportunity of criticising CDU commissioner Karl-Heinz Narjes. The CSU suggested Peter Schmidhuber, Bavarian Minister of State for Federal Affairs in Bonn, as a successor to Herr Pfeiffer at the European Commission in Brussels. That prompted SPD leader Hans-Jochen Vogel to write to the Chancellor reminding him of an agreement reached in 1981 to appoint a nominee of the leading Opposition party as one of the two German commissioners in Brussels.

Herr Vogel mentioned no names but the SPD weekly newspaper *Vorwärts* had already made it clear who the Social Democrats in mind.

But Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, a Bundestag member with experience in Brussels, made it clear she was not in the running. That left North Rhine-Westphalian Economic Affairs Minister Reimut Jochimsen and Social Democratic MEP Klaus Hänsch.

The SPD would dearly like to see a trade unionist take over from Herr Pfeiffer, thereby helping to improve relations between the Federal government and the unions. But no trade union nominee has been named. Influential sources report that the Chancellor has already decided, on the quiet, that Herr Schmidhuber is the man for the job. But that would be to underestimate Herr Kohl, who is far from incompetent where appointments are concerned.

At a time when he must be keen to see CSU leader Franz Josef Strauss make concessions in the CDU/CSU strategy debate he is unlikely to give the go-ahead until the CSU has shown signs of goodwill.

FDP leader Martin Bangemann has been less tight-lipped. In an interview he conceded that the CSU had a point inasmuch as it was "the only one of the classical parties" never to have supplied a European Community commissioner.



Is it time for a German? . . . Manfred Wörner. (Photo: Sven Simon)

Economic Affairs Minister Bangemann is keen to see the coalition parties resolve their differences in time for the 13 September state assembly elections in Schleswig-Holstein and Bremen. He is also motivated by sheer self-interest.

Despite protestations to the contrary, Free Democrats feel sure their leader plans to return to Brussels himself in 1989 as a European commissioner and successor to Jacques Delors, the French president of the European Commission.

He would do this ambition no harm whatever by being on good terms with the CSU.

Jörg Bischoff

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 18 August 1987)

Namibia: Swapo ignores the invitations and carries on



Only three years ago Pretoria and the "internal" political parties supported by South Africa in Namibia showered praise on themselves for having released a number of Swapo officials from a long term in prison.

Swapo officials released included the charismatic co-founder of Swapo, Herman Andimba Toivo Ja Toivo, known as "Namibia's Nelson Mandela".

This mutual back-slapping over their own generosity was accompanied by ridicule towards Toivo who, in a spectacular move, decided to clear out for Swapo in exile in Zambia.

There was talk in Pretoria of Toivo having been put out to graze by Swapo in exile, but the latest moves by the South Africa security authorities and the Namibian police, acting on orders from Pretoria, show that his decision to get out was the right one.

To this day Swapo staunchly opposes participation in the "internal" process in Namibia, banking instead on a twofold strategy of diplomacy and armed struggle despite the many "invitations" extended to the militant liberation movement.

Swapo rightly refers to the UN independence plan for Namibia, based on Security Council resolution No. 435.

That is not to say that rival parties and the "transitional government of national unity" in which they are represented have been unsuccessful. Apartheid has been abolished in many sectors, although racial segregation still exists in the health service and the educational system.

Reforms may make everyday life under South African rule more bearable, but "internal" politics prevents internationally recognised independence, which alone might lead to an end to the murderous bush warfare between Swapo and South Africa.

The "internal" parties are undeniably men of goodwill, but they are kept on a tight rein by the pigmentocrats in Pretoria.

Nothing goes in Windhoek without the blessing of the South African authorities.

True, the financial burden of the long years of fighting in an economically dependent territory weighs heavily on a South Africa in the throes of an economic recession of its own.

But a truly independent Namibia would weigh much more heavily on South Africa because it would be almost certain to be hostile toward Pretoria.

So powerful South Africa is trying to impose second-rate independence and limited self-government on Namibia, which would neither solve the problem nor end the bloodshed.

Until recently Namibia seemed to have been spared the domestic unrest that has swept South Africa itself, but the shortsighted decision to arrest Swapo leaders in Namibia will probably have ended this relative peace and quiet.

The world can expect an extension of the hot spot that is South Africa.

The Bonn government knows its special responsibility for the former German colony of South-West Africa, and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has owned up to this responsibility in lodging a protest against the arrests.

It was made not only on behalf of the roughly 22,000 Namibians of German extraction.

The Bonn government's strong words were warranted by the move itself.

Herr Genscher undertook this diplomatic move even though he could be sure it would trigger strong words in Munich and probably lead to further disputes within the Bonn coalition.

Yet he was right to do so. An end is in sight to the summer recess in Bonn and to the silly season of moves to gain political profile. But there is no end in view to alien rule in Namibia.

Hubert Kleine Siegemann

(General-Anzeiger, Bonn, 21 August 1987)

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■ HOME AFFAIRS

Cracks in coalition as parties try to shift their electoral appeal

Chancellor Kohl held a Press conference to pass on the message that everything within the Bonn governing coalition, consisting of the CDU, its Bavarian partner in the conservative union, the CSU, plus the FDP, is in fine fettle.

It was a breezy affair, with the Chancellor projecting an energetic and resolute image. But whether he can sustain the image remains to be seen.

He denied that there was disunity within the coalition, yet after the Press conference, the CSU said he was not speaking for the entire government.

Two bones of contention relate broadly to attempts within sections of both the CDU and CSU to win favour in different parts of the electorate.

In the CDU, the battle is for votes in the middle ground; in Bavaria it is to head off challenges from the right.

Two current issues which reflect these struggles are the issue of 14 jailed Chileans who, it has been proposed, be given political asylum in West Germany. The other is Germany's Pershing 1 missiles, which are playing a central role in disarmament negotiations.

Bonn's Employment Minister, Norbert Blüm, spoke out bluntly on torture when he visited Chile last month and met, among others, representatives of the 14, and this won him a broadside from the CSU.

Now Chancellor Kohl proposes that the disputed Pershing missiles be scrapped, under certain conditions. Bavarian Premier Franz Josef Strauss' CSU rejects this.

So unless Chancellor Kohl cracks the

Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger

whip of his special powers as Chancellor, the row on this might get worse.

At the moment, the only person who seems to have everything under control is the CDU business manager, Heiner Geissler.

No-one has yet curbed his urge to curry the favour of new sections of the electorate, not even the Chancellor.

His free rein, however, may be checked after the state election in Schleswig-Holstein on 13 September.

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) is Bonn's main man in the foreign policy field.

CDU decisions in this field, however, bear the distinct mark of Geissler.

This was apparent in Kohl's missiles decision and in his welcoming response to Erich Honecker's visit.

The Chancellor's statements on Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik may have introduced greater clarity to the political discussion, but it's still Russian roulette in domestic policy.

The strange thing is that none of the disputants are calling a spade a spade, at least not in public.

Some are fighting for human rights in Chile or in Bonn, whereas others yell out in fury as if the call to condemn torture questions the very foundations of the CDU. These proxy quarrels cover up the real problem.

Hans-Jochen Vogel (SPD) touched on the sore point when he asked Geissler whether his attempted leftward reorientation of the CDU might not increase the risk of the emergence of a new right-wing party.

If the dispute between the CDU and CSU moves in this direction the Chancellor will find it extremely difficult to settle it no matter how he tries to exercise his authority.

Vogel found it easy to advise his political opponents, since the SPD has no such problems.

The SPD has made it relatively easy for the new party chairman to get used to his role. Harmony, of course, can be deceptive.

The fact that the SPD only managed to hit the headlines once during the summer months, through its criticism of the government's defence budget, is not exactly a masterly stroke of political imaginativeness or public relations. Is Vogel's tight rein stifling ideas? In the final analysis, the CDU and CSU may find that the motto "bad publicity is better than no publicity at all" is the more successful strategy.

The worst thing that can happen, however, is a lack of ideas combined with unsuccessful actionism.

During the recess the Greens demonstrated how soon this can manoeuvre a party out of the public eye. Although hardly any other party issued as many statements on so many topics there was almost zero response from them.

The party's statements on Chancellor Kohl's Pershing proposal gave an idea of the hard times ahead for the image promoters of the Greens.

One statement said that Kohl's proposal was necessary but half-hearted; a statement, issued only one hour later, said the proposal was totally unacceptable.

So will the FDP again emerge from the summer skirmishes as the real winner?

Both party chairman Martin Bangemann and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher have best exploited the situation during recent weeks.

Bangemann improved his image without acting like a bull in a china shop. Genscher kept a tight rein on the missiles discussion.

The change of leadership has paid off, even though it is still not clear whether Bangemann intends moving to the European Community headquarters in Brussels one day or staying in Bonn.

This keeps potential successors happy and ensures their support.

The party managed the difficult feat of forming a coalition with the SPD in Hamburg almost as if it were a matter of course.

The FDP, therefore, stands united on the verge of its next party conference in Kiel.

The summer theatre produced joys and sorrows for all. The positions of the two political camps are more or less evenly balanced.

On the one hand, a shaken CDU/CSU in an on the whole still stable — thanks to the FDP and the Chancellor's "renaissance" — coalition; on the other, a recuperated SPD and a Greens party which has been pushed into the background.

Now mountains have to be moved, e.g. the tax and pensions reforms.

Will the coalition be able to knuckle down to work and toe the line following the damaging summer squabbling?

Numerous colourful swallows made a summer in Bonn, but a staunch homecomer need not necessarily make a productive autumn.

Thomas Meyer

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 28 August 1987)

State can't force homogeneity on society, warns Berlin's Mayor

Government institutions cannot force certain views on large sections of society which has other ideas about how they should live, says West Berlin's Mayor, Eberhard Diepgen.

Herr Diepgen, a Christian Democrat (conservative), made it clear in a television interview that he was including the police and the courts among the government institutions.

Diepgen's interview gave a good insight into how the younger generation of CDU politicians is thinking (he is 45).

He refused to be dragged into a discussion about whether the party was moving to the left or to the right. He concentrated on the issues.

The key words were tolerance, understanding and an ability to accept lifestyles and political views unacceptable to many staunch conservatives.

Diepgen referred to all facets of a pluralistic society which foster individualism and greater self-reliance vis-à-vis the state and society's major institutions.

Although he did not discard fundamental conservative principles his message was clear: government institutions as well as the police and the courts should not succumb to the illusion that they can force certain views upon members of a large section of society which has different ideas about how to live their lives.

Diepgen was even more specific about his support for a "modern" and thoughtful form of liberalism.

He was not far from criticising the official insistence in Bonn on keeping the Pershing-1 A missiles as absurd.

He elegantly avoided doing so, however, by claiming that this "problem" would probably take care of itself, since these projectiles would be quietly taken out of service in 1990/91.

During the discussion with the surprise guest, Egon Bahr (SPD), Diepgen's arguments on Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik could easily have been seconded by any Social Democrat.

There was no sign of trying to avoid points of contact with the SPD or of an exaggerated fear of blurring ideological differences between the two parties.

It would not be overinterpreting Diepgen's remarks to say that they are typical of the new ideas and approaches of other leading CDU politicians such as Heiner Geissler, Norbert Blüm, Rita Süssmuth and Ulf Fink.

Geissler, the CDU business manager, justifiably relates this strategic reorientation to the party's setbacks in the general election and the state elections in Hamburg and Rhineland-Palatinate.

It is fair to assume that the current conflict with the CSU is not just the result of a tactical manoeuvre to enlist the support of young, middle-aged and in particular female voters.

Geissler and those who back his strategy feel that any losses in a significant and demanding segment of the electoral potential would jeopardise the party's own ability to achieve a (relative) majority.

They class themselves as involving those sections of the electorate in which the decisive struggle for the support of the political centre between the SPD, FDP and, in all probability, sections of the Greens, will take place.

A constantly growing number of voters are demanding that all parties state their position on human rights and disarmament, rejecting outdated concepts the two main political blocs may have of their political rivals.

Emphasis is on a liberal and moderate state rather than an authoritarian institution which resorts to drastic measures to control or monitor those citizens it feels are unreliable.

Undecided voters are increasingly unwilling to tolerate the fruitless dispute over economic and labour policy principles.

This generally boils down to a conflict between free market forces on the one hand and government-backed job creation schemes on the other.

There is a growing belief that both theories contain good ideas, which could form a basis for the proposal forwarded by Ulf Fink for "concerted action" with the SPD and the trade unions.

Most of these new ideas not only represent a challenge to the SPD, FDP and the more thoughtful in the Greens party, but — in a completely different way — to the CSU.

The recent interview with Bonn Family Minister Rita Süssmuth in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* was strongly criticised by the CSU.

Frau Süssmuth openly complained that the CSU was demonstrating a dangerous leaning towards increasingly tough regulations and recourse to the action of a "strong government" in its campaign against Aids.

She referred to a dispute over principles, which also relates to abortion laws, demonstration laws, and laws dealing with alleged and actual enemies of the constitution employed in the public service sector.

The problems must be openly discussed. Frau Süssmuth, her supporters and Franz Josef Strauss all agree on this.

The conflict is rooted in extremely different ideas on the relationship between the state and its people. The dispute cannot be settled in Kohl style by simply disregarding it.

Geissler and many other CDU politicians are already thinking in terms of the post-Kohl era. This does not mean that they are out to topple the Chancellor.

However, they have to develop policies which appeal to a wide variety of voters.

The support of new voters cannot be gained by simply calling for greater harmony or avoiding frank discussions.

Peter Abspacher

(Nürnberger Nachrichten, 27 August 1987)

■ RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS

New testament research becomes a more liberal, international affair

Research into the New Testament has become more liberal over the years. The work of Catholics and those of various strands of Protestantism are often quoted side-by-side without discrimination. The subject has acquired a more international flavour, with international congresses, the use of guest lectures and the publication of works internationally. More German theological books are translated than ever before, although many American publishers complain about their verbosity. Last month 400 theologians from all confessions met in Göttingen to talk about New Testament research. Karl-Alfred Odin reports for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*.

Frankfurter Allgemeine

The congress, organised by the New Testament society which has the Latin name of Studiorum Novi Testamenti Societas, was chaired by Bishop Eduard Lohse, of Hanover, a former rector of Göttingen University.

The New Testament society was established after the war and is the only international association of professors of this discipline. It meets once a year, with each involved country taking turn as host.

The congress last took place in West Germany 10 years ago. Göttingen was chosen to celebrate the 250th anniversary of the Georg-August University in the city.

An overall view of New Testament research emerged during the conference and several contentious matters were discussed.

Themes extended from the text of the New Testament, its historical, cultural and social environment, its theological significance and questions such as how to make the contents comprehensible to people today.

More contentious issues were discussed in various seminars where researchers related their own findings.

Many seminars discussed the relationship of belief, thought and the written word to the Jews of the time, the first generation of Christians and the social environment of early Christianity.

The Romans did not at first regard Christians as an independent religious congregation but as a special group within the Jewish religion.

This meant that Christians came under the protection regulations for approved religions, religio licita.

Christians themselves only gradually drew apart from Judaism, and there was tension in this.

They found their expression in the New Testament which eventually led to a division between the two congregations.

Discoveries of Jewish and Christian writings of the period have cast new light on the spiritual world of the time. There is still dispute about the relationships between the writings of the New Testament, the Gnostics, Jewish Hellenism that came to light in the Qumran scrolls, and the other currents in early Judaism.

More is getting to be known about the social and political facts of the beginnings of Christianity and its Jewish, Greek, Roman environment. Specialists differ in their views, however.

The Americans mainly have prepared the ground for research into Biblical social history. This, just as much as psychological considerations, is vital for a development of New Testament studies. But it is only one aid among many.

Many centuries ago theologians examined the significance of literary and historical methodology for an understanding of the Bible. Experts have now learned to use the other sciences in their research. This has led to constant change in their working methods.

Insights into the dependence of choice of word and the rhythm of a sentence help to an understanding of the sentence and a knowledge of modern rhetoric helps for a better understanding of the Bible.

German theology constantly brings in non-theological sciences. An example is the significance of the history of religion school in Göttingen with its exploitation of social and social-historical knowledge.

But the nucleus of the New Testament is theology and not sociology, literature, politics or pschology.

There are a number of students who have sought to give a Marxist interpretation of the New Testament but this has found little academic approval.

Many seminars in Göttingen dealt with Biblical texts, among others with the miracles in St Matthew's Gospel, with the parable of the sower, of the growth of seed and of the mustard seed in St Mark's Gospel, with the visit of Nicodemus to Jesus by night in St John's Gospel and with the Revelation of St John.

One theme for discussion was the ethos of St Paul's theology, the demand for an emulation of Christ.

Another theme was the relationship that exists in St Paul's letters between Christ's doctrine and the relationship to the earthly Jesus.

The question of the establishment of an authentic wording of the Bible and the general development of a stable canon of Biblical scripture were also discussed.

The New Testament was once not the source for Christianity, as it is today. The Old Testament was. It took many centuries before the New Testament became established in all churches.

One seminar in Göttingen was concerned with prayer, divine service and spirituality in the New Testament, with the aid of the Letter to the Hebrews in which Paul's doctrine of justification by faith is expounded. These are themes that are increasingly examined in churches.

This is also true for the question how did members of the congregations listen to the biblical text in the period from which the New Testament originated, and how can people today understand what is written in the Bible?

The Bible and its readers and the

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Joseph Cardinal Höffner steps down

Cardinal Joseph Höffner has resigned as chairman of the most senior Catholic church body in Germany, the German Bishop's Conference. He is being treated for a brain tumor.

He is a man of firm conviction who, however, is always willing to listen to others.

He always gets quickly to the point. He knows that a person's conscience is the "final authority" when it comes to believing.

The 80-year-old Archbishop of Cologne was born in Hohrhausen/Westerwald and was ordained in Rome in 1932.

Conscience has always been a key word for Cardinal Höffner. In countless sermons, speeches and statements he has tried to outline the fundamental interrelationships which concern the Christians of today.

He only rarely deals with detailed questions but instead concentrates on general issues such as the protection of life, man and technology, peace and faith.

He does not restrict himself to ecclesiastical aspects, but touches on their effects on society as a whole, politics or economics.

He has not always been able to choose these topics himself, but his ability to deal with them is undisputed.

Höffner has a long list of academic qualifications. He was professor for Christian social [illegible] ber of doctor titles.

Some thought he might stay in the world of science rather than become a priest.

A doctorate in economics rounded off his post-war academic career, which began in Trier and continued after 1951 in Münster. He established links with many ecclesiastical and secular institutions.

The fact that he is one of the foremost advocates of the index-linked pensions scheme shows how much importance he attached to the motto of his episcopate: *justitia et caritas* (justice and love).

Sometimes uses strong words in argument, yet he is always the servant of the church, with no trace of personal vanity or arrogance.

His faith gives him a self-confidence and sovereignty which often deter his critics.

Höffner had a decisive say in the decisions of the Second Vatican Council. His influence on the policies pursued by the Vatican is regarded as significant.

He was a member of several Vatican Congregations. He belonged to the Congregation for International Evangelisation and to those dealing with Catholic education and is a member of the prefecture for economic affairs of the Apostolic See.

Anyone looking at his workload cannot help but admire his perseverance: his trips to Central America and the Philippines in December last year were so strenuous that many younger people would have found it difficult to stay the pace.

Höffner knows how much he can take on. His decision to resign as chairman of the Bishops' Conference was clearly carefully considered. It is a bitter loss for the Catholic church in Germany.

Martin Thull

(Allgemeine Zeitung Mainz, 15 August 1987)

■ PERSPECTIVE

Honecker visit raises some policy questions

Süddeutsche Zeitung

East Berlin party leader Erich Honecker's visit to West Germany this month will be the main event in the otherwise lacklustre business of relations between the two German states.

It is a chance to undo some political knots and stimulate new joint projects and provides a chance to look at policies in the area and check if they are helping basic aims.

Because spectacular political appearances are one thing. The capacities of the policies which engineer them are another.

Although the general state of East-West relations has allowed this visit to take place, the principle reason it is going ahead is the clear improvement in relations between two German states.

There have rarely been so many meetings between East and West German politicians as in recent months and only seldom East Germany been so conciliatory.

But there is still a suspicion that the mood of relations is better than the relations themselves.

Some observers even go so far as to claim that the almost euphoric atmosphere of mutual goodwill is intended to conceal the fact that no-one really knows what to do next about the real political problems. Such suspicion is justified.

The big projects, such as the construction of motorway links between West Germany and Berlin, which were always part and parcel of German-German negotiations, will soon be finished.

New projects able to interlock the interests of both sides, such as the suggestion which has haunted Deutschlandpolitik since the end of the 1970s to establish a joint power supply network, have never been more than ideas.

Efforts to discuss some of what the chairman of the Intra-German Committee, Hans-Günter Hoppe (FDP), calls the "traditional problems in this field", have been unsuccessful. He meant the amount of cash visitors from the West have to exchange when they visit East Germany, have been unsuccessful.

But Germany still refuses to allow its former citizens who have bought their way out of the country or who were granted exit permits to return for a visit.

As paradoxical as it may seem this is not just connected with the failures of Deutschlandpolitik, but also with its successes.

The impulse intended to make the consequences of the division less severe, which was the motivating force of political negotations during the 1960s and 1970s, has come up against its limits.

It is impossible to build even more perfect facilities to make border checks less complicated.

The interpretative skills of lawyers on the agreements between the two countries are also limited.

Regulating co-existence should now be replaced by a regulation of genuine cooperation.

Can Deutschlandpolitik effect this change? At the moment this seems doubtful. Admittedly, the fact that almost every *Land* Premier in the Federal Republic feels the urge to become involved in intra-German politics is to be welcomed.

However, the fact that the various *Länder* are seeking their own contacts with East Berlin officials does not make Bonn's policy as a whole look all that good.

There is a risk that too much attention is being paid to theoretical possibilities in this field. The playing of a "German card" by Moscow, for example, has almost become a myth.

Instead, we should concentrate on financial realities and the essential interests of East Germany.

The federalisation of Deutschlandpolitik and the debate about the meaningfulness or lack of meaningfulness of German reunification are symptoms of both their revival and their weakness.

Too many opinions are being spread offhand and there are too many concepts which have not been thought out. One explanation could be the lack of a clear political will in Bonn.

The politologist Werner Weidenfeld recently came up with the idea of a second Basic Treaty in order to raise Deutschlandpolitik to a new level.

Things needn't go that far, but renewed efforts to make policies more predictable and far-sighted in this field are essential.

A major state occasion such as the Honecker visit does not mean that less effort is needed, but is a challenge to do even more.

Hermann Rudolph

(Suddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 10 August 1987)

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people who heard it, is a vital theme for many churches.

Research into the New Testament has been carried out mutally by all confessions since the Second Vatican Council and the appreciation of modern biblical research.

Theological students only a generation ago had only heard of a single book by a Catholic researcher in lectures in Protestant faculties.

Today, academic works from Evangelical, Anglican and Catholic research are quoted indiscriminately alongside each other in footnotes.

After the last war the influence of German research was considerable. Then many German academics went to America. Now there is a new generation of young American academics.

There are flourishing relations between America, Germany and the other European countries by cooperation in the publication of academic works, guest lectures and international congresses.

German theological books are more frequently translated than before. But many American publishers complain that many German academics are too verbose, making them unpublishable in the US.

In America there is an increased relationship between New Testament theology and practical disciplines such as psychology and educational theory.

The training of theogolical students in Germany is regarded as robust. But there are more complaints than there used to be in theological faculties that the study of Greek and Hebrew is too difficult and that many pastors do not prepare their sermons from a knowledge of the Bible in the original.

Complaints were also heard at seminars and lectures that it was not made sufficiently clear to students how a knowlwedge of the Greek and Hebrew texts opened up the meaning of the Bible and dogma.

Karl-Alfred Odin

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 21 August 1987)

A possible path towards a reunification of Germany

The author, Dr Ingo Friedrich, is leader of the CDU/CSU group in the European Parliament.

The confusion in the discussion over zero, double zero and triple zero solutions has rekindled a discussion on the emotive topic of German reunification.

What is the nub of the latest discussion and where do the coordinates for our orientation lie?

Most European countries are more or less closely aligned to one of the two big superpowers.

Nevertheless, even before Mikhail Gorbachov was appointed general-secretary of the CPSU, European countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain had begun to emancipate themselves step by step from their hegemonic overlords.

This has fostered a wind of change and a new air of the unpredictable.

These European countries have to a certain extent started going their own way.

In this process West Europeans have a substantial lead, since they already possess a joint and powerful organisation, especially in the economic field: the European Community.

The European Community has often been ridiculed in the past as an incessantly squabbling community of shopkeepers.

It has turned out to be a new power factor, however, with a remarkable appeal for countries bordering on its member states.

Western European integration has been evolving slowly, in conflict, i.e. democratically and seeking consensus, and without the pressures of an hegemonic power.

Traditional taboos have been eliminated and the most significant aspect of this process has also changed: a sense of being European.

Never before have there been so many European-minded British, French or Turkish (!) citizens.

This has implications for Europe as a whole.

Europeans on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain would like nothing more than to directly participate in the development of prosperity and democracy which has taken place within the European Community.

For obvious reasons relating to Soviet hegemony, however, this is unlikely to occur in the near or foreseeable future.

Nevertheless, historical processes also evolve without drastic changes such as wars and revolutions.

This also applies to Eastern Europe, which views itself as part of Central Europe.

The situation there is gradually changing, with a clear trend towards more democracy, greater emphasis of the role of the individual and greater independence.

The eastern alternative to the European Community, i.e. the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), has suffered both economically and psychologically right from its inception under the imperial size of one of its members, namely the Soviet Union.

This inevitably means that emotional cohesion has remained weak and that the appeal of the European Community to individual CMEA countries will increase.

In the wake of growing internal democratisation in the Soviet Union the latter is finding it increasingly difficult to shape the course of developments in neighbouring socialist countries.

The destiny of the "European Community East", therefore, is predictable and will roughly correspond to a development which can currently be observed among Efta member states: the greater the democratic, economic and political appeal of the European Community, the more frequently Efta members will leave that organisation to join the European Community instead.

Every new accession to the "European Community West" means that Soviet analysts and strategists must do some rethinking.

On the one hand, the significance of the European Community for the Soviet Union is increasing; on the other hand, the accession of countries such as Austria, Norway or even Sweden means that it would no longer pose a military threat.

If things do develop along these lines an increasingly democratic Soviet Union will not be able to bind the members of the Eastern bloc to its own strategies to the same extent as in the past.

The result will be a gradual reorientation of the countries in Central Europe, initially in the economic field.

This could lead, for example, to an association or even membership in the European Community of countries such as Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and even East Germany.

Countries such as Bulgaria or Rumania would probably foster even closer ties with the Soviet Union in such a changed constellation due to historical traditions.

Via technology and trade agreements between the Soviet Union and a "new" European Community this would also bring about considerable benefits for the Soviet Union itself, since it would obtain better technologies and greater stability for its own "empire".

Such a development would result in a substantial reduction of tension in Europe, including the elimination of the wall of shame in Berlin which discredits the Soviet Union throughout the world.

For Germany as a whole this would initially mean the existence of two German states in the European Community — the Federal Republic of Germany and East Germany.

Both could decide how close the extent of their collaboration within the Community should be.

A historical process of the kind outlined here would currently seem to be the most probable of all conceivable models of development.

In more concrete terms: any move towards German reunification in peace and in freedom would be in this form.

Any specifically German policy aimed at accelerating such a development would probably only have limited success.

The decisive factors are a further opening up, democratisation, internal stabilisation and normalisation of the previously sclerotic and ossified Communist bloc-mindedness inside and outside of the Soviet Union.

Ingo Friedrich

(Wirtschaftswoche, Düsseldorf, 17 August 1987)

■ THE ECONOMY

Hiccup in the ritual reaction to unemployment

Month after month, the German unemployment figures are published. Month after month, the ritualised reactions are played out.

The respective sides comprise, on one hand the government and employers; and on the other, the Opposition and the trade unions. Their opposed views hardened a long time ago.

But now comes a blip in this pattern. After the last set of (worse) figures were published, West Berlin's social affairs senator, Ulf Fink, a Christian Democrat, made an appeal for concerted action by central government, the *Länder* and local communities.

This got an immmediate reaction from FDP economics expert Count Otto Lambsdorff, a former Cabinet minister, who said Fink was getting "dangerously close" to the SPD idea of "work and environment."

Lambsdorff had read the statement correctly. A Social Democrat, Wolfgang Roth, efusively welcomed Fink's suggestion while the Trades Union Federation pointed out that Fink had confirmed their own views.

The Bonn government rejected Fink's suggestion. It does not believe that action of this sort would be effective. The discussion ended, and not just because Bonn went into summer recess.

The dispute about the use of government programmes has been dealt with in many meetings. The adversaries have become tired.

But the conflict will always flare up again so long as the unemployment figure in the Federal Republic does not drop significantly below two million.

The point at issue is that the state must provide a lot of money, must be the driving force behind more economic growth so that more people become employed. But this strategy's chances of success are small.

In view of the increased unemployment for July and the unusual economic situation the opposition complains that depending on market forces cannot be the only answer to the problem.

Heinrich Franke, president of the Nuremberg-based Federal Employment Office, regrets that there is no verve in the labour market. In addition, more schoolleavers are seeking jobs and women are looking for work.

Little relief can be expected in the foreseeable future, particularly for people who have lost their jobs after being employed for 20 or 30 years and who have to compete with younger people.

Experience has shown that the older a person is and the longer he or she has been without a job the worse their chances are.

Many personnel departments decline to consider unemployed applicants. They want employed people because they consider they will have kept abreast of developments in their field.

With this kind of thinking, the difficulties of re-employing older workers become almost insurmountable.

Little has been achieved by asking employers to examine the qualifications of unemployed applicants first and not be guided by supposition.

It makes sense for the government to help. Thatis why it is intended that, from 1988, unemployed people over 50 who are taken will get up to 75 per cent of their wages paid by the state.

The money to pay for this will have to be raised through unemployment insurance contributions, from both employees and employers.

Everyone who has a job should be prepared to chip in, and not only because, for no fault of their own, anyone can fall into the same miserable situation.

All the assurances that those who are standing out in the cold will not be forgotten will gain in credibility.

In the amendment to labour promotion legislation the government has made an offer to companies. It is to be hoped that the material attractions for employing older workers will be great enough to overcome prejudice.

Labour promotion legislation, approved two years ago, already included an inducement to employers. It allowed taking on temporary workers offering advantages to companies and the unemployed.

In times when employers cannot see how far their orderbooks will stretch they act cautiously and rather work overtime than take on additional workers.

Risks are limited when an employer takes on temporary workers. So an employer is prepared to take on an unemployed person.

The SPD and the trades unions have sharply rejected this legislation, because they fear that it could be misused by extending the probationary period and permanent jobs would become the exception.

This was not in the mind of legislators

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Germany urged to shut its eyes and take its medicine

DIE WELT

London's daily *Financial Times* fired the first broadside earlier this summer when it said the much-vaunted German economy, with its sluggish growth, high unemployment and heavy taxes, lifeless markets and massive public subsidies, could no longer be held up as a model for other European countries.

Then New York's *Wall Street Journal* fired off a cannonade. It said that despite West Germany's enormous trade surpluses and negligible inflation, the third-largest industrialised nation was playing merely a second-rate role.

Now the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* has fired off a torpedo. The Swiss paper said that decision-makers were pursuing policies that were only remotely related to their knowledge of the free market system.

This complaint that "in their decisions West German politicians have gone a long way away from the principles of the free market system" is levelled against a liberal-conservative government coalition.

Abruptly West Germany, a world champion exporter, has been manoeuvred into a corner by its foreign critics from a mixture of envy and concern about their own economies.

Now a senior West German businessman, Veba boss Rudolf von Bennigsen-Foerder, is taking the same line. He said: "Looking back on the history of the West German economy it seems that it has lost its dynamism and power and parallel to that its free market cover has become thinner."

Bennigsen's views carry weight. The real GNP growth rate has been reduced from the early 1950s when it was 7.9 per cent on average to 1.5 per cent this decade.

The public sector share in the GNP increased in 1982 to almost 50 per cent.

Full of despair and in vain the state tried to hold back the falling growth rate with public spending programmes. Vital adjustments of the means of production, capital and labour were foiled.

But complaining does not produce a concept. What would be effective would be to strengthen in a sustained way the individual freedom of economic units.

The fatal errors of the past must be resolved and avoided in the 1990s, even if economic adjustment turns out to be painful.

Politicians are (naturally) concerned with getting re-elected but this selfishness must be put behind them if they want to revive the West German economy.

It would be desireable that no future exceptions to the competitive system, for which splendid reasons are regularly given for specific cases, are made whether it is coal or agriculture, steel or the shipyards.

This applies to the subsidies to the old industries just as much so to the deregulation of the postal services and the railways and for pending privatisation.

This also applies to personal tax relief, social welfare expenditure and the administration of almost all entrepreneurial undertakings.

Major tax reform is a milestone for this government. If it is just talked to death this autumn then subsidies will remain, then entrepreneurial freedom of movement will not be created.

It is vital to solve problems swiftly because markets in the Federal Republic are to a large degree sated and the German population is tending to get fewer in numbers.

Businessmen must again be able to afford their workforce so as to combat effectively persistent unemployment. Greater flexibility is related to this.

The concentration of economic power into the hands of the state must be counteracted.

Demands on the state by businessmen and trades unionists involved in social welfare affairs must be restricted.

The West German economy has assets, power and dynamism enough to survive this urgent, drastic cure, even come out of it strengthened.

Politicians, businessmen and academics must reflect together on the constantly cited principles of the free market economy system of competition.

New economic theories and hypotheses are not needed. The medicine is well known. But only if it is decisively dealt with now will the West German economy retain its economic rank and image in the world and its ability to compete internationally.

Peter Mortner

(Die Welt, Bonn, 26 August 1987)

■ TRADE

Not everyone believes Cocom can stop technology transfer to East Bloc

The Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade (Cocom) was set up on 22 November 1949 when, in the Cold War, the West decided to apply trade measures. Cocom still operates from a wing of the American consulate in Paris. It is now made up of 16 Nato partners including Japan — Iceland is not a member. There is an element of mystery about this organisation which exercises so much influence over East-West trade. Jürgen Klotz here takes a look at Cocom for the *Frankfurter Rundschau*.

Ten American Congressmen recently hammered a Toshiba radio to pieces on the lawns in front of the Capitol building in Washington.

This naive demonstration was balsam to Uncle Sam's wounded soul. America accuses the Japanese of high treason because Toshiba and the Norwegian state-owned arms manufacturers Kongsberg, contrary to Cocom regulations, supplied the Russians with advanced machine tools.

It was announced that the tools would enable Moscow to produce super-silent submarine propellers that would, in turn, make it necessary for the Americans to increase the sensitivity of their under-water detection systems.

The deal promises to be expensive for Toshiba and Kongsberg. The Senate has asked President Reagan to bar the two companies from the American market for two years. This could drive Kongsberg into bankruptcy.

This latest, and most spectacular, example of illegal exports to the USSR, has cast the spotlight on the publicity-shy Cocom.

There is mystery surrounding the organisation that has for a whole generation determined the nature and volume of trading relations between the East and West.

Cocom is charged with looking after the West's security interests in trade with the East Bloc according to a guide manual.

This says that Cocom defines and controls merchandise and technology which might help the military potential ofn East Bloc countries.

This is fundamentally simple, but in practice Cocom decisions are complicated and controversial.

In the annex to the West German Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance a part of the secret Cocom list can be found, drawn up by the unanimous decision of representatives from the member states and continuously brought up-to-date.

The first part of the annex is sub-divided into four parts; A List (weapons, munitions and armament materials), B List (nuclear energy), C List (other goods and technology of stategic importance) and D List (chemical plant).

According to Paragraph 5 of the Foreign Trade Ordinance permission must be obtained for the export of items listed in this annex. It is not correct to say that the Cocom list includes an export ban.

It designates rather, at least in principle, only products and processes that have to be approved for export. The list is a real export ban only according to local legisation in combination with the Country List C.

This list includes Albania, Bulgaria, China, Cuba, Mongolia, North Korea, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Vietnam.

Items included in the sub-division A to D cannot be approved for export to these countries. Should the German authorities interpret the regulations too narrowly then the Cocom secretariat makes a decision on East Bloc cases, and this secretariat usually gives the thumbs down.

Stuttgart-based SEL was bitterly disappointed when in the autumn of 1984 the company wanted to export to Hungary ten digital telephone exchanges, a deal worth DM30m.

Neither the Foreign Trade and Industry Office in Eschborn nor the Bonn government were against the deal, but in Paris approval was withheld and it fell through.

Even experts have problems finding their way though the Foreign Trade Ordinance annex. It includes, as already mentioned, only a part of the Cocom list. The remainder is to be found in the so-called Notes, that have not been made public in West Germany so far.

The Central Association of the Electro-technical and Electronic Industries has recently translated into German the notes only covering computer hard and software, included in the British Security Export Control List and decribing technical details of embargoed merchandise.

A 200-page book has been produced on discussions covering general matters on two items from the more than 150 of the total Cocom list.

It is mildly surprising that anything at all is shipped in the direction of the East Bloc. The very existence of Cocom is a hindrance.

It is too much to expect small companies to observe all the regulations. As these get more and more complicated all the time it takes the Federal Trade and Industry Office more and more time to process applications.

Recently the sinister list included an item that no longer defined the product but just equipment.

If textiles machinery is controlled by a micro-processor which, according to Cocom regulations cannot be supplied to the Soviet Union because the processor could be simply extracted and is not integrated into the equipment, or because it exceeds well-defined productivity limits, then the exporter can throw the contract to the winds.

An expert on Cocom affairs said that many firms do not know what is in store for them. If previously an exporter could rely on getting approval without any trouble for the export of timber-handling equipment, tool or casting machinery, there is now the question of electronic controls as a component of the equipment that bars the exporter exporting.

Obviously this does not just apply to the "classical" products of mechanical engineering, but also for modern equipment for medical technology for instance.

In addition Cocom has barred the export of computer programmes, technical know-how and design plans.

In view of this situation the second mild surprise is West German industry's silence about the patronising treatment it gets from the Paris organisation.

Industry is normally quick to voice its demands and requirements, but no-one wants to talk about Cocom.

The Central Association of the Electro-technical and Electronic Industries and the German Association of Machinery and Plant Construction, the indusrial sectors who are the worst hit by Cocom prohibitions, politely but firmly decline to make any official statement on Cocom.

Only on condition of confidentiality are these organisations willing to reveal their uneasiness about the shackles imposed by Cocom, particularly the trend to include more products and technology of sub-group C in the list under the heading of dual use, civil and military. But they do not want to be quoted. One official said that the "wildly touchy Americans" had to be taken into consideration.

It is already common knowledge that the Americans do all the talking in Cocom.

They have a deep distrust of their partners. They try, sometimes more sometimes less intensively, to make the Cocom export regulations stricter.

This brings about such irritating situations as occurred at the beginning of the 1980s when AEG, within the context of the Soviet-German natural gas agreement, wanted to supply Soviet Russia with 47 turbines equipped with rotors supplied from General Electric in the US.

Only after considerable dispute and threatening gestures did the Reagan administration finally give in.

It would, however, be a mistake to believe that American pressure is limited to major, rare instances.

An inestimable number of similar cases are processed all the time from lower down the Cocom list.

Firms from all over the world are included in their own industry's banned list because they have re-sold US products to the East Bloc without Washington's express permission or have used



only a Made in the USA component for an East Bloc contract, although both do not come under the Cocom embargo.

The owner of a small computer sales firm in Frankfurt, who uses control units made in America, said: "You can get on the list in the twinkle of an eye."

But that is not all. Once DM200,000 slipped through his fingers, because he relied on his American supplier who had not adherred completely to domestic regulations dealing with exports, in this instance clearly marked for export to West Germany.

The result was that the pre-paid goods were confiscated by the American customs and there was no reimbursement.

The businessman was extremely upset that "we have to dance to the tune piped by the country that is more or less bankrupt." He asked that his name be not revealed.

His case did not have anything to do with Cocom directly, but the differences of approach to foreign trade between the Old and the New World were made clear.

In America everything is banned that is not expressly permitted, while in most of Europe the opposite is true.

Cocom is a loose, unofficial organisation with enormous influence. In such a context Cocom then, dominated by the Americans, is felt to be in West Germany not only a foreign body but a harmful arrangement.

Unfortunately the export ban on weapons to counties in List C was accepted without reservation by West German industry. Industry knuckled under as regards other products are processes, however, which can only be explained by the greater dependence on America than on Russia, China or their satellites.

Reiner Lang is one of the few businessmen who does not mince his words. He became well-known this summer for the establishment of the first German-Russian joint venture.

Lang is owner and managing director of the Heinemann machinery and plant construction firm, based in St Georgen in the Black Forest.

Furthermore he is a member of the CDU which he mentioned immediately so that there could be no doubt about his political affiliations.

His politics did not prevent him from describing Cocom as a "dinosaur from the pre-industrial age that should be abolished straightaway."

In future West Germany will be more deeply involved in exporting than previously. It is then in the country's best interests, he said, "to pay greater attention in the high technology sector to major sales markets such as the Soviet Union and China and to push through technical transfer with these countries."

He said that it should also not be forgotten "that our neighbours are not sleeping and finally that we are not a province of the USA."

Lang is also very doubtful about the effects of Cocom regulations. He maintains that if the East Bloc countries want something they get it.

Lang only confirms what a theoretician has been saying for a long time. According to Peter Glotz, former SPD national manager, "it is foolish to believe that the flow of information to the East Bloc can be cut off by Cocom decisions."

It would be totally wrong to believe, he maintains, that Russian weapons development could be hindered to any extent by limiting technology exports.

Glotz continued: "But above all things the heroes of Cocom compromise must make clear, that it has been absolutely impossible to control or prevent re-export via third countries."

Academics such as Heinrich Machowski from the German Institute for Economic Research in Berlin take the same line. He said: "Experience has shown that an embargo has never worked."

Even against a country such as the Soviet Union it has been ineffective, he said, because Moscow is not going to let itself be blackmailed into good behaviour as regards armaments through economic pressure.

Because the Soviet leadership does not have to take into consideration individual economic interests, it is free to decide, "whether it will or will not purchase specific plant and processes. If the decision is positive then they get what they want."

Reiner Lang finds nothing to laugh about in the recent report that Cocom regulations for the export of certain personal computers will be relaxed.

He said: "My son plays with such equipment at home. You can buy them here in every department store."

Jürgen Klotz

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 22 August 1986)

■ COMPUTERS

Human speech presents researchers with a tough nut to crack

DEUTSCHES ALLGEMEINES SONNTAGSBLATT

Where is the table? the computer was asked. "Under the apple juice," came the reply.

Scientists developing computers which can speak and be spoken to are *likely to come across such gems of logic in their work.*

Processing human speech is one of the major challenges that face AI, or artificial intelligence, the sector of informatics that involves teaching computers how to think for themselves.

It is such a big challenge because intelligence can only be computer-simulated once scientists have found out how thought and perception processes work in the human brain.

Speech is the only approach they have. "Thought processes proper are simply not visible," says Walther von Hahn. "So statements about intelligence are mainly statements about speech too."

It was Professor von Hahn's computer which gave the apple-juice answer.

He heads the Hamburg research unit on information science and artificial intelligence.

He and his associates are among the world's foremost specialists in natural speech dialogue between man and machine.

One of their first projects was the Hamburg speech partner model. It entailed using a keyboard to ask the computer simple questions on a precisely defined mini-world, a living room. It was to answer the questions in an intelligent manner.

It did not just have to know rules of grammar and syntax, it also needed a knowledge of individual objects and relations between them.

Concepts such as table or chair are fairly difficult to explain. How, then, is one to explain to a computer the meaning of gross national product or consciousness?

Progress in AI research will depend to a substantial degree on the extent to which abstract background knowledge can be processed and fed to computer systems.

Even then we will still not have solved the riddle of the many and varied processes that run partly in series when people talk with each other.

In addition to "communicative processes" converting spoken words in signals computers can understand presents serious problems.

That is not surprising. People often forget clearly to pronounce word endings. They mumble and sometimes forget entire words.

Simple computer systems that can recognise individual spoken words from a limited vocabulary are already on the market.

But fluent language, as opposed to individual words, is a more difficult. The human brain can distinguish between and identify individual concepts as it hears them mentioned.

A computer first registers a spoken sentence as a continuous acoustic signal it must painstakingly plough through.

Siemens and Philips research scientists have jointly worked on this problem since 1984. Their Spicos project is aimed at analysing and answering questions posed in normal language.

Philips self-assuredly say this task can now be solved at the research level due to progress in algorithm development and computer techniques.

Spicos depends, however, on a specific speaker. Scientists must first prime the system with roughly 200 test sentences spoken by the speaker the computer is to talk with.

Regular Spicos performances are held at the Siemens research centre in Neuperlach, Munich.

What visitors are first shown of the miraculous computer does not, at first glance, seem very spectacular.

All that can be seen is a microphone, a monitor screen and a loudspeaker. The computer itself is in the room next door.

Then comes an echo of science fiction as Robert Sommer of Siemens asks the first question.

"Who made the application to the BMFT?" (The BMFT is the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology in Bonn.)

A few minutes later a metallic voice solemnly announces that: "Höge and Lang made the application to the BMFT." The assembled Siemens staff are delighted.

But they admit that Spicos cannot yet distinguish between singular and plural.

The search for the right word is a long, hard slog for the computer. To simplify the process it has been taught a handful of rules.

One is that only about 70 of its vocabulary of 1,000 words can be used to start a sentence.

It breaks down each spoken signal into phonemes, the smallest spoken sound, and works out on the basis of probability which combination of phonemes makes most sense.

It can follow up as many as 6,000 hypotheses simultaneously, although — as the Spicos project's Wolfgang Küpper puts it — the quest can sometimes lead it astray. Then, sooner or later, it gives up.

"You can visualise it as a gigantic paper chase," Küpper says, "with teams that drive off in cars to identify items.

"From time to time they are checked and the cars that are trailing the rest are retired from the race, leaving the rest in the running."

The paper chase is not over until the phonemes have been satisfactorily interpreted. This is done with reference to a computerised lexicon and by means of logical associations.

Internal queries to the Spicos data bank and the answers are, in comparison, little more than a matter of routine.

The excitement increases when the answer is to be converted into synthetic speech. It is pieced together from individual sounds stored in a speech module devised by Philips research scientists in Eindhoven, Holland. The answer resounds from the loudspeaker in a zany Dutch-sounding voice.

Processing questions still takes time, but the procedure is to be speeded up over the next three years.

The computer should by then be able quickly get used to different speakers and to conduct a short conversation by an intelligent question-and-answer routine.

Compared with the megachip Philips and Siemens are also jointly developing, Spicos is small fry, with a staff of 35, and a BMFT grant of a mere DM10m.

Yet Klaus-Steffen Isensee, in charge of the project at the Ministry, say speech comprehension systems are among the most important projects with which the BMFT is associated.

Why go to the trouble? Why should one be able to speak to a machine in the same way as we speak to each other?

Computer research scientists are not at a loss for an answer, although they are reluctant to go into *details of specific* projects at present.

"There are situations in which non-verbal communication is extremely tortuous," they say. "Speech simply comes most naturally."

In the final analysis it is not just a matter of boosting computer performance but of simplifying computer controls.

Even people who aren't computer buffs are to be enabled to handle computers — at work, for instance.

Given speech recognition, quality control staff on car assembly lines could, for instance, relay shortcomings straight to the computer in charge of production planning.

Warehouse staff could, by the same token, computer inventorise their stock via microphones.

Aircraft may one day be piloted by means of spoken instructions or telephones be made to dial automatically on being told the number.

A digitalised telephone network would provide a wide range of uses extending from automatic information services to simultaneous interpreter services for telephone calls with other countries.

If these systems were to work they would, however, need to be totally independent of any one speaker — and much more intelligent than present-day systems.

No-one will venture to suggest when that might be the case.

Is this a Brave New World prospect? Before we can make intelligent computers that understand the spoken word we will need to learn much, much more about ourselves.

What can be said for sure is that artificial intelligence will change our habits yet again.

AI research scientists are well aware of their responsibility.

"There are social tasks we must consider as being for humans only," von Hahn says, "and take care not to use artificial systems."

Examples he has in mind include medical and psychological care or counselling the unemployed.

Do we face the prospect of software as an alternative to human communication? No electronic brain can rid us of responsibility for deciding what use we want to put computers to.

Thomas Ammann

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, Hamburg, 23 August 1987)

■ ENERGY

Hurdles in harnessing alternative sources

Frankfurter Rundschau

Fossil fuels — oil and gas, and later coal — will be exhausted within a few generations. Attention is turning to other, alternative energy sources, especially solar power, running water, wind, tides, environmental heat and biomass.

But an energy specialist employed by the electrical engineering firm of Brown, Boveri AG, says that the public tends to be too easily impressed by the possibilities of alternative energy sources.

Wolfgang Kohl told a public meeting that solar power was an example. Solar power potential amounted to 20,000 times the current level of world energy consumption.

But this theoretical potential amounting to 175 billion megawatts was rapidly reduced by unavoidable losses.

Only about 14 per cent of solar radiation reaches the Earth's landmass and can even in theory be put to technical use.

This potential is further depleted in conversion and by having to compete with established energy sources.

Dr Kohl outlined how he saw the potential of the various energy sources.

Hydroelectric power: Installed capacity in Germany is 6,700 megawatts generated by about 600 hydroelectric power stations (using running water and reservoirs).

In 1985 it accounted for roughly five per cent of power in Germany using about 84 per cent of the country's hydroelectric generating capacity.

That was a high percentage, especially when it was remembered that major water resources were not used to generate hydroelectric power on conservation grounds.

Output could mainly be boosted by modernising old equipment from the water input to the generator.

Building new, small-scale hydroelectric power stations entailed high specific investment that was usually only warranted in combination with other projects.

Intensive use is made of hydroelectric power in topologically favourable parts of Central Europe.

In Bavaria, for instance, it accounts for 16 per cent of power output; in Switzerland for 60 and in Austria for 70 per cent.


Wind power: The best-known wind power research project in West Germany is Growian, near Brunsbüttel on the North Sea coast, at the junction of the Kiel Canal and the Elbe estuary.

A twin-bladed rotor on top of a tower 100 metres (328ft) high drives a three-megawatt generator. Growian was taken into service in October 1983 and trials are to continue until the end of this year.

Twenty small-scale wind generators are to be built on the Growian site, to be followed by a further ten.

Wind generators made sense in locations with steady, high winds, Dr Kohl said. They usually ran at wind speeds of between five and 20 metres per second.

These conditions mainly prevailed in coastal areas, although in some cases they also occurred in the mountains.



The turn of the future? The Growian scheme. (Photo: dpa)

Like solar energy, wind power was liable to local and seasonal fluctuation. Unlike solar power, it could be harnessed by day and, frequently, at night too. Besides, supplies were more plentiful in autumn and winter when consumer demand for electric power increased. In West Germany, wind power could on average be generated for between 1,000 and 3,000 hours a year (the year consisting of 8,760 hours). In 1985 wind generators accounted for an estimated 0.1 per cent of electric power consumption in the Federal Republic.

Mean average utilisation is estimated at 1,700 hours a year, but even though wind energy potential could in theory meet about a third of the demand for electric power, it is not expected to account for more than one per cent of power generated by the year 2000.

Solar energy: Power can be generated from solar energy in two ways: directly via semiconductor cells and indirectly via heat gathered in collectors on solar farms or towers.


On economic and technical grounds, Dr Kohl said, solar energy could only be harnessed in the Federal Republic in addition to established systems and by means of direct conversion using solar cells and photovoltaic principles.

In Central Europe the average intensity of solar radiation per square metre per year is only half as high as further south where solar cells already have a market.

In countries where sunshine is a plentiful commodity it is used to power tap water and irrigation pumps, air conditioning units and telecom facilities.

In Germany solar radiation intensity varies between summer and winter to a ratio of 24:1. So in winter substantial long-term storage capacity would be needed to top up output from solar power generated in summer. Such facilities are not yet available.

Besides, solar cells are still far too expensive. New technologies that may lead to the development of less expensive and more powerful solar cells have yet to reach maturity.



"At present," Dr Kohl said, "solar cells still take roughly as much energy to manufacture as they will generate over a 20-year lifespan."

Current estimates forecast a strictly limited market for solar power in the Federal Republic of Germany by the year 2000.

This inference must inevitably be drawn from the forecast that renewable energy sources will account for a mere *seven per cent of power output by the* end of the century, including five per cent hydroelectric and one per cent wind power.

Yet there was no lack of experimental facilities, Dr Kohl said. The largest European solar power station, on the North Sea island of Pellworm, supplies the spa centre with electric power.

It generates 300 kilowatts from roughly 340,000 solar cells arrayed in an area of 28,000 square metres (seven acres), including infrastructure.

Solar power costs DM3.50 per kilowatt to generate on Pellworm. That is much too expensive to warrant a large-scale experiment.

Comparative costs are as follows, with hydroelectric power the lowest-cost alternative.

Hydroelectric power generated from running water costs about 10 pfennigs per kilowatt-hour. Thermal power stations (coal-fired or nuclear) generate power for between 13 and 20 pfennigs per kilowatt.

Large-scale wind generators produce power for about 30 pfennigs per kilowatt, trailed at a distance by solar power, which costs between DM2 and DM4 per kilowatt-hour to produce.

The extent to which new energy systems will gain acceptance by the year 2000 will also depend on the amount of land needed (and where it is needed).

In Central Europe land is a scarce and expensive commodity, and nature conservationists jealously guard resources.

Solar power stations currently need sites about 1,000 times larger than the area needed to build a coal-fired power station.

Wind generators need an area between 100 and 300 times larger than the land requirement of a conventional coal-fired power station.

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 1 August 1987)

An urgent need for new set of priorities

Nuclear research is out. Federal government spending on nuclear research has been almost halved in two years: from DM1,565m in 1986 to an estimated DM857m this year.

Nuclear research centres in Jülich, Karlsruhe and Geesthacht, near Hamburg, have long moved on to new research sectors such as materials research and environmental protection.

It can only be a matter of time before they drop the name "nuclear" altogether.

The only sector of atomic energy research that continues to flourish and prosper is nuclear fusion, the process that makes the Sun and stars shine (and the hydrogen bomb explode).

Bonn and Brussels each invest roughly DM250m a year in fusion research, and the figure is on the increase.

That is more than is invested in alternative energy of all kinds (such as solar energy, wind power, biogas etc.).

An international lobby has succeeded in preserving a research fossil that has survived from an age of euphoria and implicit belief in technology.

Jet, the Joint European Torus, built at such expense by Euratom in Culham, England, has failed to live up to expectations.

If there are no further hitches the fusion reactor will, in its final stage, use as much peak energy as the output of a medium-sized nuclear power station, with *only 14 per cent of its energy input being* transformed into nuclear fusion.

Yet the next gigantic fusion device, Net, is already at the planning stage, with the Upper Palatinate in Bavaria as a possible location.

This multi-billion experiment will be no more than a further preliminary for a demonstration reactor, Demo, envisaged as demonstrating the feasibility of nuclear fusion at some later date.

Even if, contrary to expectations, plasma (an elementary particle gas heated to 100 million degrees) could be stabilised for sure (at present it cannot be controlled at anything over 10,000° C), a fundamental question remains.

Do we want new and even more gigantic power stations with nuclear reactors about 100 times larger and far more complicated than those of a conventional fission power station?

They may be less dangerous than a conventional nuclear power station but will probably be much more liable to break down, *if only because they are much more complicated.*

As long as over a third of electric power consumption is wasted for heating and as long as road transport could easily make do with half the motor fuel it uses and as long as endless amounts of process heat go to waste there can be no question of an energy shortage.

As long as alternative energy and other means of energy saving are not seriously developed there can be no question of any serious attempt being made to combat wastage.

And as long as this is the case fusion research will be no more urgently needed than any other category of basic research. So fresh priorities in the allocation of research funds are long overdue.

Hans Schuh

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 24 July 1987)

■ BERLIN

Exhibitions show the achievements, the suffering and the failures



Confrontation with German history is a painful experience. The "Berlin, Berlin" exhibition, put on in the Martin Gropius Building as part of West Berlin's 750th anniversary celebrations, is a tale less of national than of common human tragedy.

It extends chronologically from the Great Elector in iron to the model of plans for a Turkish arts centre in Kreuzberg.

"Berlin, Berlin" is alongside two other exhibitions. All are interdependent even though one is housed outside in a bungalow of its own.

It is a guide to the ruins of the SS and Gestapo headquarters and the power centre from which the ideas outlined in Hitler's "Mein Kampf" were put into practice.

The arts boom the Gropius Building has witnessed since the 1981 Prussia exhibition has affected the entire area, which is lined with fresh greenery and informative signposts.

Remains of foundations and the clear outline of a row of prison cells are all that is left of the focal point of Nazi power.

What went on here from 1933 in the name of the Gestapo, the Reichsführer SS and the Reichssicherheitshauptamt is outlined in an exhibition entitled "The Topography of Terror."

The two exhibitions housed next door in the museum do not concentrate on the last days of the Reich, but they, too, are permeated with items that herald the end. Their titles say it all: "The City and I" and "Berlin, Berlin."

"The City and I" illustrates people in the city as seen by German Expressionist painters and their successors.

Ludwig Meidner's 1913 self-portrait against the background of tilting houses and streets conveys the general trend.

"Berlin, Berlin" in contrast illustrates both industrial development, including entrepreneurial achievement and proletarian suffering, and historical failure.

The old plan of presenting Berlin as a "human workshop" in its 750th anniversary year, featuring its urban, social and working environment and development, has been linked with a stroll round Berlin's political history.

A film seen flickering on the screen from an imitation aircraft cockpit brings to a close the Babylon of Berlin the Reich capital, presenting an aerial view of the city reduced to rubble.

"Berlin, Berlin" is based on the presentation technique used in the Prussia exhibition. The exhibition architecture was devised by set designer Hans Dieter Schaal.

The "metropolitan myth" he houses in the museum's covered courtyard extends half-way up to the glass roof.

Steep inclines, irregular angles and jutting walls, a ribbed tower and a sheet of glass with a neon advertising slogan make up a construction consisting of quotations.

The hustle and bustle simulates the metropolitan Moloch as seen by both its admirers and adversaries in the days when Brecht put on his Expressionist play "Im Dickicht der Städte" and Ludwig Hilberseimer designed his totalitarian honeycomb-pattern city.

Repetition sounds a neutral note as it ranges from one possible interpretation to the next.

It is, initially, neither a hopeful nor a monstrous metropolitan utopia but merely the framework for the 1920s tale of tempo, technology and communication by all means and in all directions.

But the premonitions and warning signs are already apparent. To one side, seemingly arranged in an undemonstrative setting, a 1932 propaganda report entitled "Hitler über Deutschland" can be seen. It shows the Führer-to-be flying round Germany.

At the same time we are shown Jewish entrepreneurs, bankers and newspaper proprietors — while the public are gathered in the Lustgarten to await the landing of their up-and-coming Führer.

The 1939 "Motorcyclists on the Avus," the famous racetrack and urban autobahn, life-sized bikers in bronze, are seen going flat out downhill — surely a symbolic direction.

Berlin's history from 1237 to the present day and the aim of presenting it in a representative manner have led to "Berlin, Berlin" comprising an enormous amount of material.

As it covers seven and a half centuries the visitor is not necessarily numerically overwhelmed, but the exhibition is nothing if not extensive.

A cohesive tale such as the one told by the Vienna "Dream and Reality" exhibition, dealing with the origins of modernity, is ruled out by the sheer length of time covered in Berlin.

"Berlin, Berlin" takes its time. Yet the early chapters, dealing with local developments of no particular importance in



the overall historic context, tell their tale concisely and interestingly.

Joachim II of Brandenburg, in the guise of Hector, is a striking symbol of Prussia in the making.

The better-known period from the death of Frederick the Great to the advent of Bismarck is, in contrast, presented with nothing that might be considered a new approach.

Yet the city's ability to rise out its own ashes is regularly featured in exemplary fashion, arguably starting with the 1685 edict on religious tolerance that offered persecuted Huguenots and Calvinists a new home.

That, perhaps, was the secret of success, the way in which a small and insignificant town ploughed its furrow to greatness.

Located on the outskirts of the Holy Roman Empire, it was not predestined come into full cultural flower. But human endeavour can offset such disadvantages. What Brandenburg-Prussia lacked in manpower and skill it set out to import.

Population was Prussian policy: the encouragement of immigrants and cultivation of people to develop resources. In the "Jews, Huguenots, Bohemians" showroom Marie-Louise von Plessen illustrates a realistic utopia with a strictly limited but eloquent choice of exhibits. Each item relates both to the immigrants and to the city that gave them a new home. Berlin silversmiths are seen to make chalices and other religious ware for the new synagogues. Daniel Chodowiecki, a Huguenot miniature painter, paints a portrait of Jewish banker Markus Levin. French craftsmen are welcome as suppliers to the Prussian court.



Motorcyclists on the Avus, lifesize bronze figures from 1939. The Avus is an autobahn formerly also used as a racetrack. (Photo: Binder/Thiel)

They acquaint Berlin's burghers with the basics of good living and are presented in a showcase resembling the greenhouses in which they grew the city's first cauliflowers and asparagus.

The Huguenots' workshops, the Bohemians' cotton factories and the Jews' mints are not claimed to be the sole benefits Berlin derived from its new citizens.

But the inference to be drawn is clear enough. Religious tolerance was a progressive approach and a brilliant ploy on Prussia's part.

"Where will it all end?" is a question that has long arisen before the visitor reaches the room where the masks are dropped and the slogan "Jews Are Liars" is proclaimed with no fewer than three exclamation marks.

The appeal to Berliners to boycott Jewish shops and stores is made in the name of the "holy fatherland" and of traditional, nationally-tinged Christianity.

The most important sections of the exhibition deal with how successful this propaganda was. But where, and in what dark recesses, did it originate?

One main showroom is kept in total darkness, with a large caroussel faintly illuminated in the middle and featuring, behind glass, Wilhelminian court society in full dress.

The women wear trains yards long, the men clothes reminiscent of Frederick the Great and his era.

What does it all mean? The dubious nature of a method that merely presents suggestive arrangements is clearly apparent.

Yet the authenticity of the implication — that high society is mummified on the threshold of modernity — can hardly be denied.

A nearby painting shows the crowd gathered, beneath grey umbrellas, on Unter den Linden in front of the Old Kaiser's palace. They converged on hearing the news that Wilhelm I had died aged 91.

Novelist Theodor Fontane described the scene as he himself had seen it. "The rain dripped from their umbrellas," he wrote, "and they peered across the street like cretins."

Yet even he was impressed, although not in quite the same way. "But when yo then read what the newspapers made it," he added, "you are nauseated by t appalling mendacity of it all."

"Berlin, Berlin" presents the last ye of the Reich capital without resorting stage sets. It dispenses with fascist po and circumstance, does not recre marchpasts or torchlight processio preferring to make do with ... is volatile enough on its own.

In comparison with exhibits in t "Topography of Terror" exhibition t are mainly everyday exhibits testifying the exercise of power as seen by the in the street.

Everyone read the newspapers billboards, everyone saw how the legislation was introduced and enfor

No-one who walked past Ernst Ja sohn's surgery could fail to read wha sign said: "Entitled to practise in m cine for Jews only!"

Everyone saw for themselves the J who were forced to wear a yellow Star David in public. They didn't disappe overnight. And a simple example suffice to explain it all.

All Germans knew their "Nesthä chen," a series of children's tales abou little girl, the youngest in the family, read and treasured them — until 1942

They were then said to have been ten by a Jewish writer, Else Ury, wh seen twice in the exhibition.

We are first shown a photograph her as an older woman, then she "transport list" that testifies to he journey to concentration camp an gas chamber.

In "A City of Contradictions," the chapter of the tale as told in the Ma Gropius Building, the organisers st painfully clear of trouble with the c authorities that commissioned the hibition.

In this final chapter they tell only ha tale. The protest movements are pres ed, but the other side stays in the dark

The organisers clearly sympathise the squatters but prefer to turn a bl eye to the construction and corrupt scandals that have shaken the city in cent years.

The exhibition unexpectedly exp enced a comprehensive example of

Continued on page 11

This is one of an occasional series to mark the 750th anniversary of the founding of Berlin this year.

■ FILMS

Director's memoirs a bid for self-rehabilitation

Hannoversche Allgemeine

Film-maker Leni Riefenstahl would prefer to forget her past. But it won't go away.

Frau Riefenstahl made propaganda films for the Third Reich. In those days, her work made her a reputation of being "the greatest film-maker of all time."

Even today, she is regarded highly. Hollywood director George Lucas describes her as "the most modern of film-makers."

To celebrate her 85th birthday this month, the Riefenstahl memoirs have appeared. They are an act of justification and rehabilitation. For the fact is that 50 years after her propaganda films, she still faces criticism and litigation.

"Do we always have to talk of Hitler in my presence," she sometimes asks indignantly in interviews and television talk-shows.

Her *Memoiren* are an expression of her persecuted innocence and are perhaps the last production of what is in fact an extraordinary film director.

They are the result of five years' work but they are not even much of a help towards a better understanding of contemporary history. Her memory is not accurate enough for that.

Her book is more interesting as a character study of an enthusiastic artist who, in her search for the "unusual, the wonderful, the secrets of life," went off on the wrong track and into the abyss without ever observing the false road she had taken and ever regretting that she had done so.

Rudolf Augstein, publisher of the news weekly *Der Spiegel*, described the artistic legacy of the "Führer's non-political betrothed" as work "without sense, without sorrow, without understanding."

In her autobiography she speaks in considerable detail about the man in her life, Hitler. She was overcome by an apocalyptic vision the first time she heard him speak in Berlin's Sportpalast in 1932. She does not have enough words to describe the charisma of this man.

She was metaphorically stunned by him, bowled over. From that moment on she had "fallen" for Hitler, even though she turned down his "excited" attempts to get to know her better during their first encounter at a North Sea resort.

She has made out of her reserve at Hitler's advances a kind of anti-fascist resistence.

She wanted to appeal to his conscience about his racial policies until he said that "politically she was of unsound mind."

Hitler told her: "You understand nothing about politics, and it is a good thing that it is so."

In this way the heroine of the Third Reich de-Nazifies herself.

Hitler's erotic pestering and that of Propaganda Minister Goebbels, who was obviously in a class of his own when it came to fondling, are relatively uninteresting.

What is more important is how a radical aesthete such as Leni Riefenstahl, avowedly a non-political artist who always followed her "deep-rooted drive to the beautiful and harmony," was not only improperly used by a regime of terror but could fill this regime with mindless enthusiasm and voluntarily serve it.

Leni Riefenstahl does not once make any attempt to answer this.

There is no question that her film *Triumph des Willens* on the party meeting in Nuremberg in 1934 is great cinema, a fascinating symphony of movement and rhythm, of mass choreography and the transfiguration of the Führer.

The people's sense of community was raised up to a mystic height by the incorporation of every individual in the marching masses, making Hitler completely into the saviour figure.

Walter Benjamin was referring to this work, constantly described by Leni Riefenstahl herself as a harmless documentary, when he spoke of the "politicising of aesthetics," dissolving beauty in horror.

Just because she was only interested in the triumph of her "pure" artistic expression, it seemed as if she were created to transfigure National Socialism. Her naive instinct, to which she continuously returned, marched enthusiastically in step in Nuremberg.

She was born in 1902. Her father was a well-to-do plumber. She believed she had found a kindred soul in Arnold Fanck, a director of nature films and a mountaineer from Freiburg.

In 1925 she played the female lead alongside Luis Trenker in Fanck's film, *Der heilige Berg*, a production whose background was the mystery of mountains with a phony mixture of the mountain dwarf and the mermaid.

Leni Riefenstahl was slotted into this absurdly erotic nature film by Fanck who looked in mountain ranges and glaciers for the elementary powers of nature that were irrational.

Mountain climbing and skiing, the existential confrontation with nature, first-class heroic performance, which during the war was exaggerated to its limit. This was a male domain.

Riefenstahl had to spend most of her time waiting in the valley while the heroes were high up in the ice and snow fighting for their lives.

But Leni Riefenstahl wanted to achieve more. After six mountain films with Funck she had had enough of playing the nymph to a mountaineer male élite.

She has tried to use her emancipation, that still endears her in many feminist quarters, as a general pardon to assuage all resentment against her.

Her own first film was *Das blaue Licht*. She produced and directed it and played the main part. Hitler commented: "It is the most beautiful that I have ever seen." So it is not surprising that he not only gave her his trust in private but chose her as his favourite director.

In a very short space of time she shot for him *Sieg des Glaubens*, the German Army film *Tag der Freiheit* and *Triumph des Willens*.

She was eventually awarded a gold medal for her two-part film on the 1936 Olympics.

It was anything but a sport film, or at least it was a sport film mixture of contest and mass enthusiasm, a display of muscles and patriotism corresponding exactly to fascist aesthetics.

In the 1970s she made a comeback as a photographer with her pictures of the Nubian Desert in the Sudan. But sport eroticism still lived on in her work for she still used naked bodies and exotic ritual.

Leni Riefenstahl claimed to have avoided Hitler so as not to be "engulfed in the flames of his personality." She avoided Goebbels because she felt uncomfortable in his presence.

She makes allowances for the Nazi regime in her book, claiming that she only saw the dazzling side of it.

"I never once had any idea of what was reflected behind the hurly-burly and brilliance in terms of human tragedy."

Even today she cannot quite understand why her Jewish friends suddenly disappeared. "What terrible things must have happened!" she comments.

After the German Army marched into Paris she sent a despatch to "My Führer" which read: "You have done deeds that are more than human imagination can devise, deeds that do not have their equal in human history." Obviously this is not to be found in her memoirs.

In her book one rather gets the impression that after many intrigues instigated against her and heroic refusals on her part that Riefenstahl has been discovered as a resistance fighter.

Her last film was *Tiefland*, begun in 1940 and completed 1954. It is still causing her trouble.

Film-maker Nina Gladitz claimed in her documentary *Zeit des Schweigens und der Dunkelheit*, that Leni Riefenstahl forced gypsies from the Maxglan concentration camp to act as extras for her film, promising where possible to save them from Auschwitz.

"Aunt Leni," as she was called by her "darlings" from the "relief and welfare camp," did not want this serious accusation levelled against her. Her court case ended early this year with partial success for both sides.

But once again it shows that Riefenstahl remains blind to all moral responsibility of her creativity, always insisting on her absolute artistic expression which she formulated in 1935.

Apocalyptic vision in the Sportpalast . . . Leni Riefenstahl. (Photo: Archives)

This read: "The artist recognises only one battle, the battle to complete a work . . . There are no other problems for him. All other limitations do not exist."

After the war Leni Riefenstahl was considered as "a fellow traveller" in three de-nazification trials.

The verdict read: "It was not in her mind to make propaganda for the NSDAP." Her career seemed to have come to an end for even to former "friends" she was the "Nazi whore."

Even today she does not make things easy for her defenders. For any number of years she has played the part of the persecuted innocent party, the insulted diva, lamenting over her "dog's life" and *the "witch-hunt" against her.*

She said: "My enemies are invisible, nameless, but they are dreadful."

On the other hand she is not afraid of suing Erwin Leiser for infringement of copyright, because he included cuts from *Triumph des Willens* in his Hitler film.

Leni Riefenstahl is a woman whose vitality and proud imperturbability can still impress, a type of high priestess of art with a rolling "r" and flashing eyes who has disappeared.

Her fate could be regarded as tragic, and one might be tempted to admire her, if she did not show herself in her memoirs still to be stubborn, green and unteachable.

She is a living warning and memorial to artistic enthusiasm that falls into fault because it believes in serving only the triumph of beauty.

Martin Halter

(Hannoversche Zeitung, 22 August 1987)

Continued from page 10

ness, tolerance and refusal to compromise combined without the slightest commentary.

At the opening ceremony historian Felix Gilbert delivered a speech, arguably more a talk of the kind beloved of Fontane, his "beloved Fontane," from whom he borrowed the tale of a young officer from a poor but blue-blooded Prussian family.

Wondering whether he ought to marry into a rich Jewish family, he was consoled by the thought that the regular visitors to his prospective in-laws' house included Droysen, Mommsen and Ranke.

Gilbert noted that these three Prussian academics normally avoided each other's company and that they were only ever likely to meet as guests at Jewish soirées.

He then recalled his own childhood and his grandmother's home on the Landwehrkanal, an area much the same as portrayed in Georg Hermann's "Jettchen Gebert."

He later revisited the scene of his childhood as a GI in postwar Berlin, where it was buried beneath the rubble.

He wandered round looking for tell tale traces until he finally found fragments of blue and white tiles. He then knew this was where it must have been.

That was about as far as Gilbert went. He is a great-grandson of Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, the composer, and a descendant of Moses Mendelssohn, the philosopher.

He failed to mention that Georg Hermann, the writer of the popular novel "Jettchen Gebert," was sent from exile in Holland to Auschwitz and his death.

He made no mention of the fact that his grandmother, Enole Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, experienced Nazi Berlin for herself, dying as a very old lady in 1939.

He also failed to remind his audience that Fontane, the novelist he so admires and who so fittingly described the variegated strata of late 19th century Berlin society, was strongly opposed to assimilation of the Jews.

"They can be incorporated," he wrote, "but not intellectually assimilated."

Gilbert distinguishes in his academic work between traditional, conservative anti-Semitism, of which Fontane's comments are but one instance among many, and modern fascist anti-Semitism, which culminated on the site opposite the Gropius Building.

One wonders whether this historical distinction does not go too far, bearing in mind the Third Reich's fait accompli.

Sibylle Wirsing

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 22 August 1987)

■ MEDICINE

High court rejects doctor's bid for mercy-killing approval

A doctor, Professor Julius Hackethal, has been prevented by one court from helping a paraplegic patient commit suicide because it would amount to murder while another court has cleared him of helping another patient to commit suicide in 1984 on the grounds that it was not an offence.

A court has disallowed a request by a doctor to help a paraplegic patient kill herself. The Federal Constitutional Court delivered what amounted to a reprimand for Professor Julius Hackethal, who has been at the centre of several controversies over the years.

Professor Hackethal wanted the court to give him permission although euthanasia, even if the patient asks to die, is classified as homicide by the terms of Paragraph 216 of the criminal code.

This view has for years been upheld by the Federal Supreme Court.

So if Professor Hackethal had really wanted to see justice (as he interprets it) done, he would have had to risk being convicted of homicide in the case of his 27-year-old woman patient.

Appeals to the Constitutional Court are only admissible, as a matter of principle, once the appeal has been heard by all other courts.

Exceptions are allowed solely when the appeal is felt to be of general importance or if the appellant stands to suffer a serious and unavoidable disadvantage if he is first required to take his case through the lower courts.

Professor Hackethal, always keen on publicity, had worked out to the smallest detail how he planned to enable his patient to commit suicide.

He had devised a technique by which she could operate with her mouth an intravenous drip containing a fatal narcotic solution.

The city of Karlsruhe objected and threatened to fine him DM10,000 if he did act.

He appealed to the Constitutional Court, which significantly ruled that the appeal was inadmissible — and not groundless: a subtle legal distinction of far-reaching importance.

The court thus made it clear that his appeal against the ban on euthanasia did not raise an issue of general importance. He first had to take his case through the lower courts.

The Constitutional Court has long taken a most restrictive view of cases it must and must not hear — and for good reasons.

Whether an issue is of general importance does not depend on any political outcry that may arise in connection with it. The crux is whether a ruling on the case in question will clarify the position in a substantial number of other cases. If part of the public debate on euthanasia were taken as the yardstick, one might be excused for imagining that the ban is profoundly inhuman. There has been no lack of proposals for legislative change. Yet last year's Berlin lawyers' congress was surprisingly determined in ruling out any such idea. So the ban still applies, having clearly been reaffirmed by the Constitutional Court. Human life is not at the disposal of other individuals. It remains illegal to kill others — even at their own request.



Doesn't shy away from publicity... Professor Julius Hackethal. (Photo: Wolfgang Ku...)

Legally speaking, someone may want to die but he is not, in any circumstances, entitled to ask others to help him to do so.

The problem is that death can occur not just by doing something but also by failing to do something.

A husband or wife who is under legal obligation to take care of his (or her) better half is not entitled to look on idly as the other person commits suicide.

The Federal Supreme Court has made it clear that he (or she) is legally obliged to sever the noose or snatch away the gun to prevent an imminent suicide.

Doctors can be in an even trickier position if they agree to stop treating a patient who dies sooner as a result.

Many may feel this obligation on the doctor to preserve human life by machinery, sustaining a mere "vegetable" by life support systems, stands in stark contrast to dying in dignity.

They thus feel this obligation on the doctor is an unacceptable renunciation of what the patient may want.

If he wants to die, they argue (and Professor Hackethal is a staunch supporter of this line of argument), then he must be allowed — and helped — to do so, and be it for charity's sake.

Yet even if all ethical and religious misgivings were set aside, serious problems would still remain. Even when the patient is in a coma doctors cannot, in many cases, say for sure that he will never recover.

Handball international Jo Deckarm was a case in point. The doctors were disproved in his case.

And even patients who are on record as wanting to be put to death if they ever suffer from, say, an incurable and extremely painful disease cannot say for sure whether they might not change their mind if the occasion ever arose.

The Constitutional Court was well aware of these issues, all of which have been amply aired in legal literature, in arriving at its ruling on Professor Hackethal's appeal.

Yet what makes the ruling so convincing is that details went unsaid on formal, legal grounds but that the prompt dismissal of the appeal made the point no less clearly.

The point is that no man is entitled to take another's life even if the other asks him to do so. Ending human life is and remains a criminal offence.

Friedrich Graf von Westphalen

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 7 August 1987)

Bench rules 'no crime' in suicide case

Julius Hackethal hit the headlines in April 1984 when he supplied cyanide to a woman with terminal cancer.

Now, more than three years later, he has been cleared by a Munich court of being to blame for her death. The court said he had merely helped her to commit suicide, which was not an indictable offence.

The public prosecutor wanted to prosecute him but the court refused to open proceedings, upholding a December 1986 decision by a lower court in Traunstein, Bavaria, against which appeal had been lodged.

The Munich court found that the [illegible]-year-old patient had taken her life of her own free will. There were insufficient grounds for suspecting him of either killing his patient at her request or failing to help her in time to save her life.

It had been up to the patient herself to decide whether or not to take the cyanide. Professor Hackethal and Hans Henning Atrott, president of the German Society for Humane Death, had merely helped her to commit suicide, which was not an indictable offence.

Professor Hackethal was cleared of having helped to kill his patient by failing to come to her assistance.

The court found that he was not required to prevent her from voluntarily committing suicide over and above his general legal obligation to provide medical assistance in an emergency.

The patient had voluntarily chosen to refuse medical assistance even when she lost consciousness. So Professor Hackethal was under no obligation to save her life.

He was not prosecuted for failing to lend her medical assistance because, as she was dying and in pain, to do so could hardly, in the unusual circumstances of the case, have been considered to be assistance.

The patient's suffering would merely have been prolonged.

In an initial statement Professor Hackethal said the ruling was "superb." He said he had been totally vindicated and had regained confidence in the courts.

Atrott called the ruling a historic decision underscoring the human right to self-determination.

dpa

(Saarbrücker Zeitung, 8 August 1987)

■ BEHAVIOUR

A mother campaigns against use of pills to subdue hyperactive children

Roswitha Wirtz's adopted child, Joachim, was a problem child from the beginning. The older he grew the worse he got.

He screamed, he was aggressive, he fought. He was impossible. He could not be handled at kindergarten nor, later, at primary school.

The situation was desperate and played havoc with the marriage. Frau Wirtz, 36, recalls that she and her husband, Harald, were almost at each other's throats at times. Life also became hell for their other children, Thomas and Elvira.

Then they found the answer — so they thought. Pills for the hyperactive child. For a long time, Joachim took a tablet every four hours. Frau Wirtz said: "People who said we would never be able to handle the boy were suddenly charmed by him. They would say how nice he was."

In no time at all the pills made Joachim into a "calm, thoughtful child. He was suddenly like a grown-up, he concentrated on things, did better at school and even did his homework."

But Frau Wirtz said: "The pills killed his wit and charm." Somehow she did not like the boy's eerie change from a rascal to an angel.

"But the doctors said that the pills were the only therapy possible. I felt guilty about it," she said.

Frau Wirtz, who used to work in an office, told how, one day, she heard [illegible] Dortmund educationalist, on the radio.

He has written books with such titles as *Ein Löffelchen Schulerfolg. Auswüchse der Psychopharmako-Therapie bei Schulproblemen* (A small taste of success at school. Excess of psycho-pharmaceutical therapy for school problems).

In his later book, *Anpassung auf Rezept — Die fortschreitende Medizinierung auffälligen Verhaltens von Kindern und Jugendlichen* (Adjustment by prescription — the progressive turn to medicine for strange behaviour by children and adolescents), published by Klett-Cotta in Stuttgart, Dr Voss warned that treating disturbed youngsters with psychological medicines could in the long-term make them dependent on the tablets.

Frau Wirtz got very worked up about what she heard him say on the radio. "I wrote him an angry letter," she said. Voss got in touch with her at her home in Kreuzau near Düren.

He was able to dissuade her from giving Joachim the psychological pills, and he was so convincing that she now gives advice to parents, doctors and youth welfare officials all over West Germany.

In collaboration with Dr Voss she is now writing a book that will shortly be published by Reinbek entitled *Psychopillen für Kinder — Eltern wehren sich gegen Verführungen der Pharmaindustrie* (Psychological pills for children — Parents defend yourselves from the seductions of the pharmaceuticals industry).

In this book she relates what happened to Joachim, who had got used to taking his tablets himself, when she took them from him and threw them in the dustbin.

Through the local press she asked parents who had children with similar problems to contact her. In a very short space of time the Düren Parents Initiative was established.

Saarbrücker Zeitung

Roswitha Wirtz said: "I have read a vast amount of literature on the subject."

She heads the parents association and organises weekend seminars and evening discussion groups with experts, advocates and adversaries of psychological pills.

And what about Joachim? His mother said: "A few hours after he was taken off the tablets he was again cheeky. He disturbed his class and again got on our nerves at home."

But Roswitha Wirtz had taken to heart the educationalist recipe for the gradual taming of a wild child like Joachim.

She said: "The most important feature is to accept and tolerate the child. It is right and proper that the child should be as he or she is, and not changed to be someone else. Say to him: Yes, I know that you don't like the meal today, but if you throw it against the wall then you wont have anything to eat."

Or: "You have a right to your own obstinacy, but you must understand that the things that you want for yourself are also there for others."

Frau Wirtz began with "consistent teaching." She and her husband no longer bristled at the trouble-maker.

Consistent teaching means not tough teaching but not wavering.

They spoke to Joachim calmly and quietly. "When you do stupid things that's your problem. You yourself have to be responsible for the things you do."

The idea gradually caught on. The Wirtz family is now through the worst with Joachim, now 11, whose face is covered with summer freckles.

His mother said: "He is affable at home. We do not have great rows about him any longer. He would do better at school if we were to give him the pills. He is lovable like he used to be and full of fun. But we don't want to make him into a stereotyped child, stimulated by pharmaceuticals."

In the same way 30 parent couples in the Düren area have come to terms with their disturbed children better, 29 boys and only one girl. Not all of them were problem children from birth.

Reinhard Voss mentioned Elke, aged 10, who was a little schoolgirl without any problems, but who suffered emotional disturbance because her teacher suddenly asked her mother to supervise her homework, which Elke had always done independently.

Elke's mother made her into a doctors' case. They prescribed psychological tablets for the little girl, medicaments for "cheeky, poor-performance children," without looking into the background of the "disturbance," as Voss always recommends.

The Munich-based "Commission for psychiatric violations against human rights" is convinced that "parents with hyper-active children should not be worried, for long-term studies have shown that these children develop in the normal way and in later life will not be either asocial or disturbed."

Not all doctors see things in this way, but more and more are coming round to this view.

A scientific institute attached to the compulsory medical insurance scheme in Bonn has produced figures on the prescription of sedatives and psychological medicaments for children.

These figures show that nationwide within the space of 12 months 547,000 prescriptions were issued to children up to the age of six and 418,000 to children between six and 14.

This is almost a million prescriptions in the national health system alone. The figures do not include the sale of sedatives that do not need a prescription.

The medical magazine *Deutsche Ärzteblatt* reports that there has been a decline in the number of prescriptions issued for sedatives for children.

But Herbert Reichelt, a scientist attached to the compulsory medical insurance service, commented: "The lack of statistics for previous years makes it impossible to say that there has been a decline."

There is evidence, however, that doctors are currently issuing ten million fewer prescriptions for sedatives nation-wide than they did in 1982.

Then there were 54.5 million prescriptions of this sort, in 1985 there were 44.6 million.

Most of these prescriptions for sedatives for emotional and nervous disorders, 70 per cent, were given to women.

Hans Willenweber

(Saarbrücker Zeitung, 30 July 1987)

Probe into why divorce can be 'inherited'

People who grow up in broken homes are less likely to marry happily than people from intact homes. There is a risk that history will repeat itself, particularly for children who are under 16 at the time of the divorce.

This phenomenon was first observed in America and described as the "inter-generation tradition of marital instability."

Hans-Peter Heekerens of the social affairs department of Munich University has had a critical look at this in an article published in the *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*.

In his view research into this situation has for a long time been blocked by a series of misleading attempted explanations.

In the tradition of Freudian psychoanalysis experts have "blindly" guessed that those concerned, as small children, must have managed without sentiment, in the sense that they had not had enough parental love which made them incompetent in loving.

Such a mechanical concept of people, assuming that they are programmed in their childhood like robots, has been overtaken academically.

There is no empirical confirmation of the theory associated with this that children of broken homes "inherit" from their parents detrimental expectations of marital happiness or make impossible demands on their partners.

The next generation of hypotheses, supported by the post-Freudians, is no better underpinned by real evidence.

These hypotheses state that because of the break-up of their parents' marriage they have before them only examples of failed, non-functioning, relationships.

Links of this sort have not been found in examinations of the behaviour in relationships of children from divorced and successful marriages.

In both groups there was no differences in their relationship attitudes towards the opposite sex and the various aspects of living together.

As far as can be seen children of marriages that end in divorce are not spoiled in their sexual-role identity, that is in their identification of themselves as male or female.

By comparison with many others they come off well. Even if their marriage rate is similar to that among the children from successful marriages they tend to live more frequently together unmarried, frequently have pre-marital sex and are less inclined to complain of a lack of contacts with other people.

Another academic hypothesis predicts a "loss of inhibitions effect." Because of the example set by their parents children of a broken marriage are less resistent to the Gordian Knot solution to marital problems.

This idea has only a semblance of truth about it, according to Heekerens, stemming from the proven fact that children of divorced parents more frequently approve of the idea of divorce.

On closer scrutiny the fact emerges that this is a mistaken assumption that comes about because those concerned frequently come from lower social groups where such ideas are more readily accepted.

People in similar social groups have the same attitude towards divorce whether their parents were or were not divorced.

At this point, according to Heekerens, the fact is that the greatest risks that children of a divorce run are economic and not psychological, which causes them to get divorced later themselves.

Children from divorced parents are in population groups that suffer doubly from economic and social disadvantages. On the one hand they come out of difficult situations more frequently, because of the high divorce rate among the lower classes. But on the other hand, as a result of their parents' broken marriage, they undergo a drastic social decline.

The divorced mother particularly, who usually has custody of the children, has to manage with less money. Even then, if she re-marries, the children do not come out of it well on average.

Heekerens said that "taking everything into consideration it can be said that more than a half of the children from divorces to a greater or lesser degree spend long periods of their adolescence in financially difficult or even extremely difficult financial situations."

It is an established fact that marital stability stands or falls by family income and education levels. Seen from this point of view children from divorced homes are typical of disadvantaged classes.

They get married for the first time when they are very young and are put at a disadvantage as a result of low results at the end of their schooling and many premarital pregnancies.

They do not manage to get into good job positions and frequently have partners for life with similar social charac-

Continued on page 15

■ SOCIETY

Press is accused of pandering to prejudice in gypsy-camp row

One day, as nine-year-old Gretel was minding her own business and keeping an eye on the farmyard geese, her eye caught something very strange indeed on the other side of the field at the edge of the forest.

"Some waggons pulled up and out stepped some people. They were dark-haired and their skin was a deep brown colour. Gretel had never before in her short life seen such people, and she felt almost afraid of them.

"It was not long before her suspicions were confirmed. Some of the men approached the flock of geese and took some away before her very eyes. Gretel protested at this injustice but the men grabbed her and bound her arms behind her and threw her into one of the waggons. She found herself among a horde of half-naked children. Then the waggon began to move and Gretel had no way of knowing where they were going to."

Dark-haired, dark-complexioned people with obviously evil intentions: they could only be gypsies. The excerpt comes from a children's book published in the 1920s but its message, that of itinerant groups stealing livestock and posing a danger to any children whom they happened to come across, was common even up to the 1950s.

Obviously, it is a parable that has left its mark: Father Lothar Weiss, a Catholic priest who works with gypsies in the Ruhr, says he has heard from various parts of Europe stories about gypsy children being sent out to steal. And behind the children are always the shadows of dark men in dark places who whip and threaten the children to carry out their nefarious wishes.

A nun had years ago told him about press attitudes to gypsies in France. The stories could have been written yesterday. Nothing had changed.

The theme is old, but the versions are never ending: one is taking place in Cologne. And the local Press is fanning the flames by bringing out all the old stereotypes and, without bothering to check the facts of the matter, printing indiscriminately what suits their purposes.

The story concerns a group of gypsies of Yugoslav origin camping on the site of an airfield outside Cologne which, apart from a strip used by an aero club, has been abandoned.

The gypsy families all came in the last year from France and Italy, where they had been until French and Italian residence laws were tightened up sharply.

They had heard of Cologne and that, although not expecting to get work there, believed they would be left alone.

The conditions in the camp first came to light only after a police raid in January, when the winter was particularly vicious.

It was discovered that the families were living at minus 10 degrees in makeshift huts made out of plastic sheeting and bits of wood. There was no running water and no lavatories. The only form of heating were heaters formed out of benzine canisters to burn wood.

The reason for the raid was that pickpocketing offences in the Cathedral area of Cologne, which is next to the central railway station, had risen by 180 per cent and burglaries by almost 100 per cent.

Police kept arresting children who would not say where their parents were, so they were sent to a children's home where they were cared for and then released. Nothing more could be done, because children under 14 are not liable for prosecution.

The children were from the site at the disused airport. The police reported the events as they saw them. The Press blithely accepted whatever the police said. The talk was of "unscrupulous men behind the scenes criminalising children"; of "gypsies of Polish origin" being arrested which, as everyone knows, meant "social welfare recipients who drive round in Mercedes cars."

The headlines reported on "The School For Thieves" and how the itinerants had trained the children "like dogs and set them loose in pairs to rob tourists."

A Cologne schoolteacher, Kurt Holl, belongs to a citizens initiative set up to help the gypsies. He says the children steal because of economic need.

He regards the Press as the puppets of the police and says he was shocked at the way local journalists "accepted uncritically even the most adventurous allegations of the police." Neither did the Press forget to mention the children's ethnic background.

The issue became so inflamed that Holl's group accused a special police investigation committee of racism and defamation in such strong terms that police chief Klaus Stüllenberg hit back with a legal suit.

The families on the site left Yugoslavia about 20 years ago out of pure economic need to look for something better in Western Europe, and most of them stayed in Italy and France. When the laws were tightened and they decided to come to Germany, some applied for political asylum, others applied for German passports and others who could neither read nor write German just waited on the site.

But no one can live from nothing and so the children, the least likely to be prosecuted, were sent out to ferret and steal.

Efforts were made in the city to find a humanitarian solution, but voices also began to rise in protest. The citizens in-

Frankfurter Rundschau

itiative puts a lot of the blame on the inflammatory way the Press has reported the affair.


A local Social Democrat party branch was "disturbed" that a group comprised "overwhelmingly of criminals" was on the site and demanded their removal.

A minister of religion took up the police version in the best, upright manner, and said in one newspaper that "children are working for men behind the scenes... men who have for years been receiving social security payments and who have luxury villas in other countries and who drive expensive cars."

At one stage, passengers at one railway station were being warned by loudspeaker that they should hold on to their handbags as the station "is teeming with gypsy children trying to steal from passersby."

The state prosecutor and the police were working at top pace. Every time an adult was arrested, it was one of the shadowy figures in the background.

This fixation was strongly influenced by a case a short while before in Milan in which some Romany gypsies from Yugoslavia had been given long sentences for keeping their children in "slavelike" conditions and forcing them to break the law. People in Cologne had convinced themselves that Milan conditions had been foisted on them. The mania grew so much that even Father Weiss was regarded as a suspect. His home was searched and when a stolen ring was discovered, his explanation was all but ignored and the papers ran headlines like "Did a priest help the men in the background?" Then followed enough details to make it clear which priest was meant, even though his name was not used.



Excuse me for living. (Photo Manfred Wegen[...])

The issue came to a head when the prosecutors office, exasperated at the never-ending stream of arrests of children they couldn't prosecute, threatened to sue the city of Cologne itself on the grounds of ignoring the children's welfare unless it took some sort of action.

The result: 10 children were locked behind bars in a specially built room in a children's home.

"A children's jail," accused father Weiss. The children were released after four days and, when that happened, many of the gypsies quickly packed their belongings and left Cologne.

Suddenly, the city was left almost without any gypsies. But not quite. Some stayed behind.

They perceived a change of attitude both by the city administration caused by both a reaction against what had happened and also be the fact that the exodus caused a sharp drop in crime in the Cathedral area.

As the hysteria over the gypsies took on more embarrassing forms, the youth authorities set up an aid team. Workers from eight specialist fields went to work from a headquarters and began helping out.

Of the 40 children they deal with, several are among those arrested several times near the cathedral and some were among those locked in the children's home. But, since the team moved in, there has been hardly any trouble. And when trouble does happen, the police deliver the child into the hands of the team.

The team has developed an atmosphere of trust with the gypsies. Mothers on the site let their children travel together with team workers on the bus to the headquarters in Cologne.

Here the children have showers, eat, sing songs and play. These children had not even learnt to play properly — such a taken-for-granted thing for German children.

The first time the team workers went to the site, they were affected by the sheer squalor: tired-out mothers, children with rotting teeth caused by bad diets, youths and young girls looking pale and unhealthy despite spending all day out in the fresh air.

If children did not go out to stea[l] many of them would go hungry. It be[-]came clear that every child had a famil[y]. Ute Wiegmann, head of the Roma-Hi[lfe] team, said: "We have seen nothing [of] these men behind the scenes." It was [ob]vious why the children stole.

No one knows how long the team [will] be needed. Head of the Cologne You[th] Authority Franz-Josef Schulte said [the] position of the gypsies was so uncert[ain] that no one could say what the situ[ation] might be in two months.

There were always emergencies: [it] took Frau Wiegmann a week to [find] out who was going to pay the me[dical] charges for a women bitten by a rat.

But in the meantime, there is at l[east] now a water hydrant for the more [than] 100 people on the site and lavato[ries] have been erected.

However, the airfield is partly [used] by an aero club. Members drive past [the] camp to reach their clubhouse and [they] drive so fast that storms of dust [are] kicked up which cover the area in [...] and frighten the children.

When women want to go shop[ping they] have to first walk 800 metres to the [bus] stop, and then change to tram to get to the supermarket. But the first accommodation provided by the city is ready. It is primi[tive] but it hints at better things to come.

A copper workshop is to be provid[ed] for one family with church help. Oth[er] people are thinking about how [the] children could be integrated into schools if the gypsies are allowed to [stay] in Cologne.

Herr Holl says: "It will all be se[en to] make sense first when, with determina[-]tion and imagination, the basic prob[lem] of the gypsies, their illegal positio[n is] solved."

As long as they all have no resid[ence] permit with all the supplementary [pa]pers that would allow them to take th[eir] wares to the market and sell them, i[t is] all, says Father Weiss, merely drop[s in] the ocean.

One gypsy father told Frau Wi[egmann] that he wouldn't blame anybo[dy] for taking action against errant childr[en] when the gypsy community have [ma]naged to get some work and norm[a]lised their lives. But, in this situati[on?] he asked rhetorically.

Ingrid Müller-Münch

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 24 August 1987)

■ FRONTIERS

Neo-Nazis on playground murder charge

STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG

A murder trial in which four skinheads are charged with killing a 17-year-old youth has heard evidence about neo-Nazi affiliations and homosexual violence.

The victim, Roger Bornemann, was kicked insensible and finished off with a metal dustbin and a piece of wood in a school playground.

The accused are all 18- and 19-year-olds. One is at a vocational school and the other three are unemployed.

The court, in Hanover, heard that after the killing, the four went and drank a beer — and were arrested the next day when the corpse was discovered.

They told the police they had attacked Roger because he had knocked over a bottle of schnapps. His father, Gerd Bornemann, says there was another reason.

His son had to die because he had told the police a few days beforehand details of what the gang had been up to.

If this is true, it remains a mystery why he then still went off with the gang. His father last saw him a few hours before his death when he came home with a black eye, took a bottle of gin from the refrigerator and rushed back out to his mates, who were waiting for him outside on the street.

The five of them went round town. Roger was given another beating. The others finally agreed that he must be got rid of for good.

"We've got to bump him off," one of them is reported as having said, "otherwise he will split on us."

Twenty-seven witnesses and three experts are expected to give evidence at the trial. The verdict is expected early next month. There is a political, and certainly a social background to the killing.

Gerd Bornemann as co-plaintiff and his lawyers Hela Rischmüller and Gerhard Schröder, SPD leader in the state assembly, see Roger as having been the victim of a gang murder.

They argue that he wanted to part company with the friends with whom he had earlier helped to found a branch of the neo-Nazi splinter group, the Free Workers' Party (FAP).

It was later renamed the National Sport and Security Comradeship EK 1 (EK is the German abbreviation for the Iron Cross, a wartime decoration for valour).

Is the trial of Tom, Peter, Jürgen and Marco, who are charged with joint homicide, really a political trial, as the victim's unhappy father and his lawyers claim?

Gerhard Schröder, one of Bornemann's lawyers, has already called on Lower Saxon Interior Minister Wilfried Hasselmann to ban the FAP.

Gerd Bornemann is a Social Democrat and trade unionist. For many years he brought up his son and daughter singlehandedly.

He soon noticed that Roger was under a bad influence at school and had him transferred to another school in the hope that he would make more suitable friends.

That proved a serious mistake. "Roger used to get into fights on behalf of Turkish friends at school, then suddenly he began to hate foreigners."

He joined the skinheads as a 15-year-old, wearing their garb, and was evidently impressed by their show of strength.

His father let him have his long hair trimmed down to a military crewcut, making him indistinguishable from other skins.

Gerd Bornemann tried to prevent the seemingly inevitable. He burnt the midnight oil discussing with his son the Nazi regime, race hatred and the annihilation of the Jews.

Roger gave him an attentive hearing but one day announced that war was being waged on the streets, that everyone — punks, foreigners and skins — was armed.

All of them went around with at least cans of CS gas, he said. Such primitive arguments, advanced by Roger's new friends, proved stronger than his father's attempts to make him see reason.

Roger failed to find an apprenticeship and first went to trades college for a basic year's career training to get off the street. He also joined the neo-Nazi FAP.

The FAP hit the headlines by raising their arms in "Heil Hitler" fashion to salute the Belsen concentration camp guards who were hanged by the British soon after the war and buried in Hamelin.

In Hanover the FAP was a nuisance for weeks when members rented a house in an inner-city suburb, draped a black, white and red flag (the prewar colours) out of the window and sang Nazi songs night after night to the accompaniment of recorded Nazi music.

To his father's dismay Roger began distributing FAP leaflets and bringing back home the propaganda he had failed to get rid of at street corners.

When the FAP drew a virtual blank in the autumn 1986 local government elections (after having fared just as badly in the previous state assembly elections), 20 members quit and formed the "Security Comradeship," arming themselves with weapons from a break-in at an arms dealer's.

Shortly before Christmas the police cleared up the break-in. The gang was identified as having been responsible, and the police found two guns in Roger's room.

He made his first, lengthy statement to the police, and from then on was scared stiff. He played truant from trades college and spent his evenings at home.

He no longer wanted to have anything to do with his former friends who were now threatening and abusing his younger sister on the telephone.

"Son," his father told him, "you seem to be dying a little day by day." Roger had already owned up to having played a part in the break-in and arms robbery.

What his father didn't know was that after making his first statement to the police Roger had been buggered by an old Nazi and the skins had filmed it with a video camera.

He was also not to know that six weeks later, just after making his second statement to the police, Roger was to be murdered in cold blood by his former friends in an idyllic forest playground one cold winter's night in February.

Hans-Peter Sattler

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 21 August 1987)

Extreme right consists of a variety of splinter groups

Right-wing extremists reject parliamentary democracy. They want an authoritarian or totalitarian state and feel that the interests of the individual must be subordinated to those of the nation as a whole.

They are also agreed in an abstruse racism, frequently accompanied by aggressive anti-Semitism and hatred of foreigners.

Germany's organised right-wing extremists were back in the news when Rudolf Hess died in Spandau and was buried in Wunsiedel, Bavaria.

The Cologne-based *Verfassungsschutz*, or Office for the Protection of the Constitution, which monitors political extremism in the Federal Republic, estimates there are about 22,000 of them.

Their outlook is governed by the Führer principle and the idea of establishing an elite. Their aim is to set up a "Greater German" state.

The largest organised group on the outside right of the German political spectrum is the *Deutsche Volksunion*, or German People's Union, classified by the *Verfassungsschutz* as "national liberal."

The DVU claims to have 16,000 members. The *Verfassungsschutz* feels a little over 12,000 is probably a more accurate figure.

Its membership is basically on the decline, as is that of the National Democratic Party (NPD), which hit the headlines 15 to 20 years ago (and created a scare in Germany and abroad) by polling over five per cent in state assembly elections. NPD membership is now down to an estimated 6,100.

A further 4,000 to 4,500 extremists are classified as members of neo-Nazi groups and other organisations.

The term "other organisation" may sound somewhat vague, but right-wingers belong to an infinite variety of splinter groups. About 250 of them seem to be loners without links with specific groups.

Last year 73 right-wing extremist organisations were registered, or five fewer than in 1985. This decline is clearly due to the groundswell attraction of the *Freiheitliche Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*, or Free German Workers' Party (FAP).

A neo-Nazi group infiltrated by supporters of the ANS/NA, which was banned in 1983, the FAP gained in membership last year and now has over 400 members.

The Aid Organisation for National Political Prisoners and Their Families, with roughly 250 members, is another group that is thought to be influenced by the banned ANS/NA.

It supports about 30 right-wing extremists jailed in Germany and abroad, including prisoners convicted of terrorist offences.

About 230 extreme right-wing activists are classified as violent. Roughly 90 per cent are neo-Nazis. Militant neo-Nazis maintain close contacts with fellow-Nazis in other countries for organisational and propaganda purposes, occasionally using their international contacts to smuggle weapons.

While the National Democrats and groups classified as "national liberal" claim at least on paper to support democracy, the neo-Nazis make no secret of their dislike of this form of government.

As one neo-Nazi magazine puts it: "Democracy is bunk. There was only one Führer, Adolf Hitler, and we need him now more than ever. Order is what we lack, from A to Z." Another pamphlet unmistakably proclaims: "Smash This State."

Right-wing militants take such demands seriously. Last year 71 acts of violence attributed to right-wing extremists were registered by the authorities.

This figure may be six fewer than the previous year, but the *Verfassungsschutz* says that gives no cause for sounding the all-clear. Militants are still more than ready to resort to violence.

Verfassungsschutz records list the age and profession of the 77 right-wing extremists who were convicted of crimes of violence last year.

Thirty-five per cent of the offenders were aged 14-20, a further 39 per cent were under 30.

Thirty-four per cent were blue-collar workers or tradesmen. Twenty-six per cent were apprentices, 20 per cent unskilled workers, 10 per cent schoolchildren or students.

Right-wing extremists have sought for years to gain political influence over groups such as the skinheads, but they were not particularly successful last year.

Even so, an estimated 200 skins are said to have swelled the ranks of right-wing extremists, distributing right-wing propaganda, sticking bills and spraying walls.

They are also ready to lend a helping hand when violence is used against political opponents.

Günther Braun

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, Cologne, 26 August 1987)

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teristics. Heekerens' view is that on account of this "mechanism" divorce in the middle classes also, where there is even more at stake, has a stronger influence on marriage stability among the children.

He concludes that it must be understood that the inter-generation divorce tradition is a social as well as an emotional inheritance.

The needs of the moment are that single-parent families should be protected from social hardship.

Rolf Degen

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 17 August 1987)

Unemployment

Continued from page 6

when the law was passed. The aim was to give the unemployed the chance to make a first step in a job. At least the worker could then show in the time what he or she could do.

If the worker "made a hit" the employer might be interested in taking him or her on permanently.

Whether the legislation has proved itself will only become apparent in the autumn.

It is in the best interests of employers to use the legislation responsibly and so reduce the high number of overtime hours worked, that has brought down harsh criticism on their heads.

Recently employers have passed the buck for prolonged unemployment to the labour exchanges.

A survey of 3,500 companies in North Germany showed that only six per cent turned to the exchanges to fill a job, 31 per cent did so generally and 63 per cent rarely or never applied to labour exchanges to fill a vacancy.

The wholesalers and exporters association said that the reason for this was that the labour exchanges only looked for applicants from their files without knowing what kind of workers a company required.

It is not only the unemployed who must change their ideas and learn something new.

Michael Brandt,

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, Cologne, 14 August 1987)